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BY

PROLOGUE
Gold surrounded Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the former First Lady who sat across me in
her apartment explaining, “In terms of the Philippines, especially in the case of President
Marcos and myself, we based ourselves on the role of man and woman, because of the
cultural genesis of Adam and Eve.”1 She went on, clarifying, “From this there were
doubts about whether women had souls; it was even suspected that Eve was the root for
the word „evil‟.”2 Mrs. Marcos delineated the story of Genesis in order to introduce the
framework through which she characterizes the roles that she and her husband assumed
as First Man and Wife of the Philippines. These roles align with the essential gender and
cultural conceptions she attributes to the Catholic Philippine mindset. She continued,
outlining an inversion of the traditional story, “In the Philippines, the man was malakas
(strong), the opposite of weak Adam, and the woman was maganda (beautiful), the
opposite of evil Eve. During the term of Marcos‟s presidency, I was very criticized, but I
followed the dream of Filipinos, to be beautiful while Marcos was strong.”3
Indeed, Ferdinand Marcos‟s strength distinguished him from the preceding
politicians, largely cut from the fabric of corruption, cronyism, patronage, coercion, and
fraud that comprises Philippine politics. I believe, however, that this tradition, though
endemic, results from the specific colonial shaping of Philippine history – not preexisting
Philippine culture. Despite his nearly 20-year rule, upon closer inspection, Ferdinand
Marcos does not look so dissimilar from his kin. Not the aberration of the system, he was
1

2
3

Marcos, Imelda. Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2008.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the apotheosis of the Philippine political tradition. Previous Philippine politicians had
committed the same sins as Ferdinand Marcos, but never at such a national, prolonged,
and vigorous level. Ferdinand Marcos was the perfection of the system, for he too is cut
from the same cloth, born from the same political culture, and ascended through the same
ranks of government. To his contemporary political class, Marcos departed from the
mutual respect that accompanied the patronage system, where power merely passed back
and forth in tacit agreement between the two political parties. To a cynic, however, he
merely dared further than the rest to achieve the Philippine political dream.
Towards the end of his life when lupus erythematosus ravaged him, Marcos
himself seemed very concerned with how history would remember him. In his diary,
which William Rempel describes as “a decidedly odd document blending history and
myth,”4 Marcos wrote:
I often wonder what I will be remembered in history for. Scholar? Military
hero? Builder? The new constitution? Reorganization of government?
Builder of roads, schools? The green revolution? Uniter of variant and
antagonistic elements of our people? He brought light to a dark country?
Strong rallying point, or a weak tyrant?5
Such self-flattery is not misplaced given that God, in a dream, told Ferdinand Marcos to
save his country and that he was “the only person who can do it … nobody else can.”6
Mrs. Imelda Marcos, who had initially characterized her husband as malakas,
reminded me, “But at the same time, after Marcos became president, I asked him why he
didn‟t institute the death penalty and he said, „The art and use of power is that it should

4

5
6

Rempel, William C. Delusions of a Dictator: the Mind of Ferdinand Marcos as Revealed in His Secret
Diaries. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993: xiv
Ibid., p. xii.
Ibid.
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never be used, only felt.‟”7 Such wise restraint seems ironic given Marcos‟s use of
violence and coercion; however, it does ring true with regards to his treatment of the
judiciary. I will argue that it is above all Ferdinand Marcos‟s delicate and skillful
manipulation of the Philippine Supreme Court that proves him to be the perfection of the
system, not the aberration.
Here, I do not primarily seek to assess what Marcos did for his country. I will
assent that he did much good, particularly during the first three years of martial law. Nor
will I deny that to many at the time, martial law seemed the proper response to the
turbulent disarray of the 1970s Philippines, albeit repressive and heavy-handed. My
research rests and is a comment on the particular historical tradition of Philippine politics,
so I will contextualize President Marcos‟s 1972-1986 dictatorship within that perspective.
I wish to intervene within the existing academic debate on the nature of this tradition and
challenge the older scholarship, such as that of Carl Lande, which presents Philippine
political history through a patron-client lens. Lande posits,
In reflection of behavioral patterns rooted in the Philippine kinship
system, the Philippine polity … is structured less by organized interest
groups or by individuals who in politics think of themselves as members
of categories … than by a network of mutual aid relationships between
pairs of individuals. To a large extent the dyadic ties with significance for
Philippine politics are vertical ones, i.e. bonds between prosperous patrons
and their poor and dependent clients.8
Instead, with regards to the political system, I wish to side with more recent
characterizations, particularly John T. Sidel's 1999 work on "bossism" and Juan J. Linz‟s
1998 version of Max Weber‟s “sultanism.” Sidel and Linz‟s theories dethrone the patronclient framework, which places undue importance upon landholders, while also
7

Marcos, Imelda. Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2008.
Lande, Carl H. Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics. New Haven: Yale
University, 1965.
8
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emphasizing the role of American colonialism. Their vision is one of personalistic rule,
with Marcos as the single, national “sultan” operating in a country of small, local
“bosses.”
I disagree, however, with Sidel‟s argument that Ferdinand Marcos is the
aberration of the political tradition. The scholar Mark R. Thompson similarly argues,
“Marcos broke the informal rules of Philippine democracy and later changed the game
altogether by launching a dictatorship … it had survived until confronted with
[Marcos].”9 While, Sidel writes,
A national oligarchy … has further reinforced factional competition for
the presidency and thwarted national-state based monopoly … preventing
the national economy from falling into the hands of a single predatory
boss … Longtime president Ferdinand Marcos was the only boss able to
overcome these obstacles under conditions strikingly similar to those
enjoyed by the small-town, district-level, and provincial bosses examined
in [my] previous chapters … Marcos began his first term (1966-69) to
extend the prerogatives of the presidency.10
Though Marcos did achieve more than any other “boss,” I believe it is important to
distinguish Marcos as very much within the system. My interpretation shifts the blame
away from one individual operating within a flawed yet, largely, healthy system and
instead, draws attention to failures of the system itself.
Arguments that Marcos should be viewed as the master of the system do appear in
the literature. The Philippine history scholar, Benedict Anderson, in his seminal work on
“Cacique Democracy” reviews the formation of the Philippine democratic system and
introduces Marcos as a historical inevitability. He writes,

9

Linz, Juan J., and H.E. Chehabi, eds. Sultanistic Regimes. Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press,
1998: p. 211.
10
Sidel, John T. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999: p. 144.
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[I]t was only a matter of time before someone would break the rules and
try and set himself up as Supreme Cacique for Life … From one point of
view, Don Ferdinand can be seen as the Master Cacique or Master
Warlord, in that he pushed the destructive logic of the old order to its
natural conclusion.11
Anderson, however, also endorses the countervailing argument, writing, “But from
another viewpoint, he was an original; partly because he was highly intelligent, partly
because, like his grotesque wife, he came from the lower fringes of the oligarchy.”12
From there, Anderson explains Marcos‟s unique excesses as a result of his non-elite
standing and his understanding that “wealth serves power, and the key card is the state.”13
I side with the argument that Marcos is the apotheosis of the tradition and further
it by focusing on the role that the judiciary played in the Marcos regime. I argue that the
Supreme Court‟s legitimation confirms that Marcos did not break the Philippine political
system, but that rather, the tradition bent to include him. Unlike Anderson, who presents
Marcos as a historical inevitability, I argue that external forces provided him with the
tools necessary to establishing a dictatorship. Even long after colonialism, U.S. interests
remain a factor in Philippine politics. Were it not for the “special relationship” with the
United States and the Cold War context, the Philippine people and their judiciary may not
have tolerated Marcos‟s abuses or bent the political tradition to include him. Along with
the Supreme Court, the Cold War and the contemporaneous Southeast Asian trend
towards more authoritarianism states equally legitimated Marcos‟s regime.
Though Marcos‟s rule was far more extreme than any who had preceded him, the
Supreme Court dutifully legitimated Marcos‟s every action. The judiciary was the most
11

Anderson, Benedict. “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams.” New Left Review
I.169. (May-June, 1988): 3-31.
12
Ibid., p. 20.
13
Ibid.
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respected branch of government prior to Marcos‟s reign and without destroying or
reconfiguring the Supreme Court, Marcos was able to maneuver the judiciary and win
their validation. Unfortunately, in times of crisis the judiciary is constitutionally weaker
than the executive, however, even when Marcos gave them the chance to in Javellana v.
The Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court did not defy him.
Previous politicians repeatedly subverted the rule of law, but the magnitude of
their actions never required judicial approval in the way that Marcos‟s did. Because
Marcos was the extreme, it was only under him that the judiciary was put in a position to
define the limits of this tradition. For this reason, the judiciary was hailed as a “powerful
and independent institution,” despite the fact that corruption plagued Philippine politics.14
Their inability to place the rule of law above Marcos, not only bends the Philippine
political tradition to include Marcos, but also confirms what the Supreme Court never had
to formally acknowledge before – that the system itself operates outside the rule of law.
Placing Marcos within the Philippine political tradition requires an examination of
the decisive colonial history that built that tradition. Through the lens of my apotheosis
framework, I will examine the martial law regime primarily, but will also provide a
historical narrative of the early Marcos years and the formative colonial history. Then,
leaving aside the economic, humanitarian, and military aspects, I will dedicate my
investigation of martial law to Marcos‟s obsession with maintaining an appearance of
constitutionality. To this end, I will review the role and actions of the Philippine Supreme
Court under martial law. I will examine how Marcos cornered the judiciary so that it
served less as a check on his power and, rather, as a legitimizer of his power both
14

Del Carmen, Rolando V. “The Philippine Judicial System Under the New Constitution and Martial
Law.” Texas International Law Journal. 9. (1974): 143-155.
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domestically and abroad. I will frame the larger implications of the judiciary‟s actions,
both within the regime as a whole and as contextualized within the Philippine political
tradition.
The existing literature on the Marcos years of 1972-1986 is largely politically
focused. The research examines the maneuvers of President Marcos and rarely grants
primary attention to the judiciary. I will review the most important of Marcos‟s legal
tactics relating to martial law, securing unchallenged rule, and creating an appearance of
constitutionality. I will then investigate the Supreme Court‟s response to these identified
actions. In this way, I seek to understand the capacity in which the sole statutory
institution that Marcos left intact, operated and served the Philippine president versus the
Philippine people at its most pivotal moment. I believe that my unique interview access
to key historical Filipino figures provides an opportunity to review the history, deliver a
fresh and informed argument within the debate, and leave a rich record of oral history.
My contribution to the academic literature is not only my support for and
development of the apotheosis framework, but also the oral history record I am leaving in
the process. I conducted interviews with former President, Fidel V. Ramos, Ramos‟s
daughter, Angel Ramos, Supreme Court Justice under President Corazon Aquino, Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, Congressman Teodoro Locsin, and the leading attorney, Ricardo
J. Romulo, and leading constitutional scholar, Father Joaquin Bernas, who were both
framers of the 1987 Constitutional. From the Marcos camp, I interviewed the former First
Lady, Imelda Marcos, Justice Minister and Solicitor General under Marcos, Attorney
Estelito Mendoza, Defense Minister under Marcos and the architect of martial law,
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, and Presidential Legal Counsel and Lawyer for the Office of
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Government Corporate Council under Marcos, Hon. Manuel L. Lazaro. I‟ve interviewed
the technocrat and Finance Minister under Marcos, Cesar Virata and a Greek
businessman who married into the elite Lopez family, was a close friend to Senator
Benigno Aquino, and a fervent Marcos opponent: Steve Psinakis. I‟ve also interviewed
my father, who is from a pro-Marcos family, but was a strong critic and demonstrator
against the Marcos regime: Stephen CuUnjieng. Lastly, from the U.S. diplomatic side, I
interviewed the American Ambassador during the People‟s Power Revolution from 19841987: Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth, and the Deputy Chief of Mission at the
American Embassy in the Philippines: Ambassador Philip Kaplan.
I understand the complications of using non-academic sources as analytical tools;
instead, I will present my interviews as records from involved persons, who have devoted
a lifetime of contemplation to Ferdinand Marcos and his place in Philippine history.
Additionally, I will rely on US periodicals as my contemporary martial law years
newspaper resources, because the Philippine newspapers are far less reliable due to
Marcos‟s control of the press. Indeed, during this time period, Filipinos themselves
regularly turned to American newspapers in order to obtain more accurate information
about events at home.
My personal family connection to the history continually reminds me that these
were very much real events, not just the subject of academic debate, and demands that I
ground the history. My grandparents, Ricardo and Helen CuUnjieng, were dear friends to
Ferdinand and Imelda. Helen CuUnjieng was one of Imelda‟s “Blue Ladies,” her group
of twenty-five young, wealthy, high-society women, who assumed a political role during
the campaign and continued to frequent the palace and political circles once Ferdinand
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Marcos had been elected President. For some time Ricardo CuUnjieng used to play golf
with Ferdinand every day, which was surely quite a feat given a dictator‟s demanding
schedule.
My grandparents; however, were not Marcos‟s economic cronies and their loyalty
was not founded on financial ties. Besides social embarrassment, the appearance of
family disunity, and a demonstration of CuUnjieng disloyalty to the Marcoses, Ricardo
and Helen did not stand to lose anything when Stephen began protesting against Marcos.
Nevertheless, Stephen‟s family betrayal profoundly changed the CuUnjiengs, the legacy
of which shaped my understanding of the history and sparked my life-long interest in the
topic.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE MARCOS QUESTION
FERDINAND E. MARCOS
Ferdinand Marcos was born in Batac, Ilocos Norte in 1917 to a family involved in
local politics. Marcos pursued law at the University of the Philippines, but was brought to
court in 1935, during his final year of study, for the suspected murder of Julio
Nalundasan. Mr. Nalundasan had defeated Ferdinand‟s father Mariano Marcos‟s bid for
the House of Representatives district in Ilocos Norte. Then, merely two days later,
Nalundasan was shot dead while brushing his teeth by his bathroom window. Ferdinand
Marcos was trained in firearms and a prime suspect on an assumed motive of family
vengeance.15
Convicted by the Court of First Instance, Marcos studied for the bar examination
while in jail and topped the bar – earning marks of 100 in criminal law, 100 in
international law, 100 in legal ethics, 98 in civil law, 97 in procedural law, 97 in
commercial law, and 95 in political law16 – gaining many sympathizers and admirers.
Ferdinand Marcos, merely 23 years old at the time, defended himself brilliantly and the
Supreme Court acquitted him of the crime in 1940. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Marcos‟s
protégé, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Justice, and the architect of martial law,
reflects on his dear friend Ferdinand Marcos‟s rise, describing,
[A] brilliant student, bar top notcher, he was a barrister par excellence and
he became famous, he was written about by all the newspapers and
magazines … Then after that the war broke out, he became an officer in
the Philippine army and then integrated into the United States Army for

15

Celoza, Albert F. Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism.
Westport: Praeger, 1997: 23.
16
Scores recorded from the official, framed certificate in Mrs. Imelda Marcos‟s apartment.
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the Far East … went to Bataan … then he went through the death march17
and was released and joined the underground again18 and earned more
medals. After the war he ran for Congress, became a young congressman
and … a star in the House of Representatives and then he ran for the
Senate and he shined all the way through … he was marked to become
president.19
Beyond being a famed and tremendous legal mind, Ferdinand Marcos sought to
paint himself as a war hero. He exaggerated his guerilla exploits and pitted himself as a
courageous and proud nationalist against the postwar political backdrop of Japanese
collaboration. Albert Celoza‟s account reports,
[Ferdinand Marcos] had been awarded medals of recognition right after
the war, but twenty years later he became the most decorated hero of the
Philippines, eclipsing even the most recognized leaders of the resistance
against the Japanese. It was contended that he received some nine medals
in one day in 1963 from the President in order to dissuade him from
running for the presidency himself.20
Ferdinand Marcos did indeed run for president and won two terms, after which he
prolonged his stay in power by imposing martial law. The multi-dimensional, largely ad
hoc character of Marcos‟s presidency, due to the anti-dogmatic nature of personalistic
rule, has given rise to academic conflict over how to categorize Ferdinand Marcos‟s
regime.
In 1988, David Wurfel, a canonical Philippine historian, characterized the early
martial law years to be “authoritarian-technocratic,” the middle years of the late 1970s as
“neopatrimonial,” and the end as a return to technocratic rule.21 Scholars such as Robert
Stauffer in 1979 and Robin Broad, present Marcos as representing foreign strategic and
17

The 1942 Bataan Death March was a horrendous Japanese war crime inflicted upon 75,000 American
and Filipino prisoners of war.
18
Ferdinand Marcos had been a guerilla fighter against the Japanese.
19
Enrile, Sen. Juan Ponce. Personal Interview. 6 Aug. 2008.
20
Celoza, Albert F. Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism.
Westport: Praeger, 1997: 23.
21
Wurfel, David. Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
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economic interests. As Gary Hawes observes, however, this framework fails to account
for the opportunities Marcos gave to his cronies and the creation of export monopolies,
which subverted the desires of the World Bank, IMF, and U.S. government.22
Various scholarship, such as that of Belinda Aquino in 1987, approaches Marcos
as a unique actor within the Philippine political tradition. Aquino argues, “While
corruption has always been part of Philippine political life, it reached epidemic and
flagrant proportions during the Marcos years,” and demonstrated “a certain pathological
dimension,” that she believes warrants viewing personalistic rulers as necessarily distinct
from other actors within the tradition.23 She explains that one must “look at the role of
individual dictators themselves in the destruction of their own societies,” underscoring
the unique aspects to Marcos rather than laying blame on the system itself.24
Benedict Anderson‟s 1988 “Cacique Democracy” paper argues that “Don
Ferdinand can be seen as the Master Cacique or Master Warlord, in that he pushed the
destructive logic of the old order to its natural conclusion.”25 Anderson‟s interpretation,
however, mixes the two sides of the debate and incorporates the role that he believes
Marcos‟s non-elite background played in pushing him further than his elite predecessors.
Anderson writes,
But from another viewpoint, he was an original; partly because he was
highly intelligent, partly because, like his grotesque wife, he came from
the lower fringes of the oligarchy. In any case, he was the first elite
Filipino politician who saw the possibilities of reversing the traditional
flow of power … [A]lmost from the beginning of his presidency in 1965,
22

Hawes, Gary. The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987.
23
Aquino, Belinda A. Politics of Plunder: The Philippines under Marcos. Quezon City: Great Books
Trading and the University of the Philippines College of Public Administration, 1987.
24
Ibid., p. 83.
25
Anderson, Benedict. “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams.” New Left Review
I.169 (May-June 1988): 3-31.
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Marcos had moved mentally out of the nineteenth century, and understood
that in our time wealth serves power, and that the key card is the state.26
Anderson‟s framework presents Marcos as the inevitable conclusion of the historical
political tradition. The historical political tradition, however, does not necessarily predict
that a Ferdinand Marcos should eventually appear. Marcos came to power during a very
precise moment in history; the Cold War gave rise to many similar authoritarian, military
regimes in Latin America and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. That the Philippine people
would have allowed Marcos to so extend the limits of their historical political tradition
without this context, due to his sheer will alone, is far less likely.

THE PATRON-CLIENT LENS
Academic scholarship in the 1960s tended to frame the Philippine political
tradition through a patron-client lens, Carl Landé being the preeminent scholar of this
category. Landé examines the nuances of the patron-client relationship, which he believes
determined the shape of the particular political tradition. He explains,
The heavy reliance placed upon dyadic relationships, both vertical and
horizontal (i.e. between unequals and equals), and the relatively slight use
made of organized groups capable of pursuing common goals helps
explain the strong emphasis in the Philippines on the pursuit of particular
rewards, including exemption from the application of laws, and the
relatively slight interest in the achievement of categorical goals, such as
general legislation. This, in turn, affects the nature of relationships
between politicians at various levels of government, between politicians
and administrators, and between politicians and the public at large. It also
explains why those organized interest groups found in the Philippines take
pains to avoid permanent identification with either political party.27

26

Ibid.
Landé, Carl. Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics. New Haven: Yale
University, 1964: 2-3
27
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Later, political economy scholars of the 1970s, such as James C. Scott emphasized that
patron-client relationships take root according to socioeconomic factors, highlighting the
widening social inequality and failure of the state and villages to provide subsistence and
security. Generally, however, the patron-client lens remained the dominant interpretation
of Philippine politics, until more recent studies, which finally dared to break from this
framework. These newer studies, such as “Bossism,” remove the importance placed upon
the landowning elite class28 and pay fresh attention to the entrenched roles that violence,
fraud, and local power monopolies have played over the last century.

BOSSISM
John Sidel‟s “bossism” successfully contextualizes Third World local strongman
rule. Written in 1999, Sidel rests his theory on Joel Migdal‟s 1988 study of the local
strongman. Migdal theorizes that these local bosses employ effective “social control,” by
“having themselves or their family members placed in critical state posts to ensure
allocation of resources according to their own rules, rather than the rules propounded in
the official rhetoric, policy statements, and legislation generated in the capital city.”29
Sidel‟s theory, however, rejects the idea that the nature of Philippine society
breeds local strongman rule. Sidel challenges such cultural analyses by evaluating the
integral roles that state structures and violent coercion play in perpetuating this kind of
governance. Sidel believes that the most “distinctive and decisive” force in the

28

“More recent studies of the contributions of forest, mineral, and marine resource exploitation – and
public land – to the process of capital accumulation in the Philippines cast considerable doubt on the
centrality of private landownership in the generation of wealth.” (Sidel, 10)
29
Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988: 256.
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entrenchment of bossism in the Philippines was the colonial experience under the U.S.
He describes, particularly, “the subordination of an extremely underdeveloped state
apparatus to elected municipal, provincial, and national officials in the American colonial
era.”30 Sidel argues that,
Bosses have emerged and entrenched themselves when and where the
local political economy has lent itself most readily and most fully to
monopolistic control, through illegal activities, nodal commercial and
transportation chokepoints, public lands, and heavily regulated crops and
industries. Insofar as such monopolistic control over the local economy
has hinged on state-based derivative and discretionary powers, singlegeneration mafia-style bosses have depended and heavily on superordinate
power brokers for backing.31
With regards to the Philippines, Sidel notes that the established, inter-rivaled
national oligarchy long fostered continual factional competition for the presidency and
funded opposition candidates. This prevented a “single predatory boss” from capturing
the economy. Sidel then reviews Ferdinand Marcos as precisely such a “single predatory
boss” and presents Marcos as the anomaly of the political tradition. Sidel notes that
Marcos was successfully different from temporary lower bosses and other previous
politicians due to his heightened access to and dependence upon foreign loans, his
exploitation of government “development” opportunities, and the elite‟s increased
reliance on government loans and favors.32 Sidel explains what Ferdinand Marcos single
national-level bossism looked like from the declaration of martial law in 1972 to the
People‟s Power EDSA Revolution in 1986, as follows:
Freed from legislative interference, Marcos ruled by decree, centralizing
national police forces under the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
establishing quasi-government monopolies for major commodity exports,
30

Sidel, John T. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999: 12.
31
Ibid., p. 141.
32
Ibid., p. 144
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and parceling out regulatory and/or proprietary control over the other
strategic sectors of the national economy…among a close circle of family
members, cronies, and frontmen.33
Though Marcos did all this to the greatest historical degree, however, none of these
actions were new to Philippine politics.

SULTANISM
Max Weber first espoused the theory of sultanism and Juan J. Linz later
developed it for application to the Marcos regime and others such as those in Cuba,
Nicaragua, Iran, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Max Weber theorized sultanism to
be an extreme form of patrimonial authority, explaining the relationship and distinction to
be:
Where domination is primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by
virtue of the ruler‟s personal autonomy, it will be called patrimonial
authority; where indeed it operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it
will be called sultanism ... [and] consists only in an extreme development
of the ruler's discretion. It is this[,] which distinguishes it from every form
of rational authority.34
Then, elaborating, Juan Linz characterizes the ideal contemporary sultanistic regime to be
when the rule is:
[B]ased on personal rulership, but loyalty to the ruler is motivated … by a
mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his
power without restraint … unencumbered by rules or any commitment to
an ideology or value system. The binding norms and relations of
bureaucratic administration are constantly subverted by arbitrary personal
decisions of the ruler, which he does not feel constrained to justify in
ideological terms. As a result corruption reigns supreme at all levels of
society ... The staff of such a ruler … [are] often … members of his
family, friends, business associates, or individuals directly involved in
33

Ibid.
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus
Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978: 231-232.
34
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using violence to sustain the regime. Their position of authority in society
derives merely from this relation.35
Essentially, sultanism is the developed case of personal rule, differentiated by the
ruler‟s fusion of private and public roles, its lack of a guiding ideology, and the lack of a
rule of law. Indeed, even sultanistic regimes break their own norms due to the inherently
arbitrary nature of personal rule. The lack of a uniting programmatic purpose, moreover,
often leads sultanist rulers, such as Ferdinand Marcos, to fabricate an ideology as
propaganda and implement it by „revolution‟ to remove the opposition and legitimize the
regime.36 Thus, after declaring martial law in 1972, in order to quell the Communist
threat, which was effectively eliminated by 1976, Marcos then justified martial law as the
only means to create the revolutionary, socially just, and economically equitable “New
Society” he claimed to seek.37
The particular nature of the Marcos regime and its developmental context within
the larger scope of local strongman rule in the Philippines, acutely resonate with
sultanism and bossism, respectively. As Stephen CuUnjieng notes; however, “You have
to understand, what in hindsight looks very logical or like progressive moves or steps …
were improvised and were based on where there was push back and where there wasn‟t
push back.”38 In this way, one should continue to evaluate debates and theories that
attempt to explain history with a critical eye. There were no comprehensive,
predetermined master plans for Marcos. He followed the letter of the law and the
tradition, but continually pushed it further. For this reason, one recognizes the footsteps
35
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of past politicians in all of Marcos‟s action, which is what allows for a pattern of moves
or thought to be discerned. Rather than a master plan, however, the pattern aligns with
historical precedents that join Marcos to the tradition.

MARCOS IN RETROSPECT
In a personal interview, I asked Atty. Ricardo J. Romulo, one of the framers of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and a leading Philippine lawyer, whether he considered
Ferdinand Marcos to be the extreme of the entrenched system, seeing in him the
embodiment of all the ills already present in the political tradition or as an aberration of
the system, breaking all the norms and departing from the tradition. Romulo concludes
that Ferdinand Marcos truly was both, explaining, “[Marcos] was riding the course of
history quite well and manipulated it to his advantage.”39 Analyzing the history and
motives that led Ferdinand Marcos to declare martial law in 1972, Atty. Romulo
recounts,
He was a brilliant man and a very, very clever politician, and I think what
he did was both to look at the trends and manipulate some of it to his
advantage. 1) He could not run again because he had had two terms 2) the
Communist threat really was increasing and that was the time for
radicalism … So I think he could see that he could manipulate [the]
protest and radicalism to show enough danger to invoke martial law.
That‟s how I would look at Marcos, not so much that he was an aberration,
but … [as] the leader … at the right place at the right time in so far as
autocratic rule … But ... the course of history really was, after [World War
II] … trending to [autocracy] because of the communist threat [and the]
inability of the presidents to solve economic problems. President Roxas
died so soon, President Quirino had an excellent economic plan, but he
was not a good leader; the opposition could run circles around him …
Then there was [the] overall issue of collaboration with the Japanese
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[during their wartime occupancy, which]40 emphasized nationalism …
And Marcos, in the sidelines, having popularized himself as a guerilla
leader, a hero, this and that, was able to take advantage … and present
himself not only as a war hero but also as a nationalist.41
Such perversion of the rules to suit his self-interest, essentially characterizes Ferdinand
Marcos. Atty. Romulo focuses primarily on the historical circumstances that gave Marcos
the opportunity to go further than his predecessors, rather than pointing to larger systemic
failures within the political tradition. One should note that the lucky opportunity of this
particular Cold War moment in history also lies upon a backdrop of endemic corruption
and a precedent of power grabbing, which together gave Marcos the necessary tools for
and very possibility of establishing a personalistic dictatorship.
Substantiating Atty. Romulo‟s claims, Mark R. Thompson, a proponent of Juan J.
Linz‟s sultanism and a recent scholar on the Marcos years, confirms that Ferdinand
Marcos‟s lied about his “heroism and courage.”42 His tales about his experience as a
guerrilla fighter against the Japanese were very much political tactics. Thompson ascribes
this to the “Marcos style,” in which “any type of dissimulation or chicanery or bribery or
coercion is applicable.”43 Thompson elaborates on Ferdinand Marcos‟s war tales, stating
that,
During the war Marcos had organized an Ilocano44 gang of „forgers,
pickpockets, gunmen, and racketeers‟ engaged in extortion and the black
market. He transformed his guerrilla group into a political machine that
built up a constituency by claming war benefits from the U.S. government
and got him overwhelmingly elected to Congress in 1949. The fake war
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medals he received as a political favor a decade and a half later were
evidence of how much influence he had gained in the legislature.45
When posed the same question as given to Atty. Romulo, Stephen CuUnjieng
replied more decisively. Stephen had protested heavily against the Marcos regime until
eventually the Marcoses personally requested that he leave the country in 1984.
Reflecting on Marcos‟s position within the political context, Mr. CuUnjieng argues,
He is the extreme of the system, because he came out of the system, he
broke it after extending it, but he was a product of the system … and
moved up legitimately … He wouldn‟t have been tolerated and accepted if
he wasn‟t embodying qualities of the tradition.46
Ferdinand Marcos did not immediately establish a dictatorship upon coming to power. He
served his first term and built a strategy to secure a second term, which was a historical
first, only after which did he resort to more drastic measures to remain in power.
The former President, Fidel V. Ramos, who was the Chief of the Armed Forces,
implementing martial law, and later the Secretary of National Defense, before ultimately
becoming President of the Philippines in 1992, intimates a different inside opinion of
Marcos. Ramos describes Marcos using language that strongly resembles that of Sen.
Juan Ponce Enrile, demonstrating the country‟s uniform regard for Marcos‟s legal
acumen, however, he then emphasizes the influence of the First Lady. Ramos explains,
I think it is accurate [that Marcos is the apotheosis] in hindsight, because
at the time [that] he was in wealth and power he appeared to be the most
brilliant of all Filipinos in the 20th century ... As a young student, topnotcher of the Bar, he was brilliant and patriotic and as far as I can
remember he was a good example for Filipinos, but then things changed
after he assumed power. Now you may recall that in his first term … he
really did a good job as President of the Philippines, then in his second
term it was mixed in terms of the interest of the country as a whole,
because he was already starting to plot how to prolong himself in power,
45
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the result of which was martial law. It was mixed because more and more
he came under the influence of the First Lady … being in the corridors of
power for four years … put all kinds of ideas into his head and I think that
was part of it. Some people wrote books … about the conjugal
dictatorship.47
Many believe that Imelda Marcos‟s desire to remain in power helped to drive Marcos
down the path he eventually took. Mrs. Marcos‟s unabashed immoderation focused the
spotlight on her. In contrast, Ferdinand Marcos was something of an ascetic, who did not
indulge himself in the same fineries as his wife. However, one should also note that
Marcos was very skillful at handling all those around him. In the same way that he
married Imelda for political reasons, it has also been suggested that Marcos chose to paint
her as the corrupt one to deflect attention away from himself.
Amb. Stephen Bosworth, the US Ambassador to the Philippines from 1984-1987,
differentiates Ferdinand Marcos from the other Filipino politicians of his time and
tradition. Putting aside all theories, Bosworth simply places primary importance upon
Marcos‟s desire to stay in power. Bosworth states plainly, “Marcos was much smarter
than his contemporaries and more ruthless than his contemporaries and by the mid 1970s
he was at a point when he could not envision any future for himself beyond being
president of the Philippines.”48 Power, indeed, drove Marcos, but presidents before him
had been equally power hungry, nevertheless, Marcos was the first to even win
reelection. Marcos was more successful at the playing the same game, not only because
of his greater prowess and daring, but also thanks to the Cold War context in which he
came into power.

47
48

Ramos, President Fidel V. Personal Interview. 2 Sept. 2008.
Bosworth, Amb. Stephen. Personal Interview. 18 Sept. 2008.

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09

22

Striking a very different note, Atty. Estelito Mendoza, Marcos‟s former Solicitor
General and Minister of Justice, contextualizes Ferdinand Marcos, asserting,
I think he practiced the same [patronage politics], but in a more
sophisticated way. For example, it‟s because he was a leader and he‟s a
dynamic leader and his leadership is real. He‟s not a leader simply because
he‟s president, but because people believed in him. So he did not have to
play the usual politics of patronage just like you have now.49
The leadership that Mendoza admires in Ferdinand Marcos is incontestable, however, his
subsequent argument does not follow quite as clearly. Mendoza draws a comparison to
the current president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo‟s, pithy 500 peso patronage handouts,
which he deems a waste of money. Mendoza highlights instead Marcos‟s construction
projects, which garnered him much support.50 The Philippines is indeed indebted to
Marcos for the vast infrastructure he built and improved, however, Mendoza‟s argument
ignores the heavy patronage that was also a central tenet to Marcos‟s politics.
The former Presidential Legal Counsel to Ferdinand Marcos, Hon. Manuel
Lazaro, who like Atty. Mendoza remains vigilantly pro-Marcos, also notes the superlative
leadership that Ferdinand Marcos embodied. Lazaro goes still further to champion
Marcos as a true aberration from the cycle, declaring,
He was able to change the political and domestic landscape in so many
ways … First of all, there were no elections for a long time … I have a
strong feeling [that was because] he wanted people to have more
discipline, so he could emphasize the value of good leadership. He was
able to dismantle goons, armies … With his entry, there were no more
warlords. Elections were only for local elections and this time anybody
with talents, without money, could run.51
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Lazaro‟s benevolent depiction of Ferdinand Marcos subscribes to the belief that Marcos
was creating a “New Society,” which Marcos himself presented in revolutionary terms. In
this light, Marcos‟s true intent was not to prolong his stay in power, but to change and
discipline Philippine society. Ultimately, despite his blatant desire for power, Marcos did
too wish to instill a discipline that he believed Philippine society lacked.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile shares Hon. Lazaro‟s understanding of Marcos‟s intent.
Though Enrile eventually broke with Marcos immediately prior to the EDSA revolution,
Enrile states that he did so “as a matter of self-protection, self-preservation.”52 Enrile
explains that he feared an assassination attempt on his life should a military junta
successfully overthrow Marcos, who was gravely ill at the time and unable to defend his
position.53 Despite his ultimate defection, it is evident that Marcos remains a hero to
Senator Enrile. When posed the same question as to Marcos‟s place within the Philippine
political tradition, however, Enrile evidences a far more realistic understanding of martial
law than others from the Marcos camp. As Enrile explains,
Well he was skillful in playing the game and he inserted himself into the
elite group because he was not really a member of the elite. He cultivated
the friendship of the elite, and inserted himself. He was accepted, and in a
sense, for a while, he allowed himself to become a tool of the elite ... At
the same time, he was also planning for himself and when the time came,
that‟s why I suspect, I do not know this for a fact, but I would imagine that
he wanted to try to control the elite in the country so then when he
declared Martial Law it leveled off the political and social playing field.
But, there are many imponderables in the life of men; he got sick and he
wasn‟t able to accomplish his purpose. In the mean time, absolute power
corrupts absolutely, [his] relatives started to enjoy power and they thought
that it would be infinite and endless and so corruption set in and that
eroded the popularity of Marcos, eroded the popularity of his regime, and
it ended up in the EDSA Revolution of 1986 … [Due to his sickness, he
was not able to complete his] control of the people around him. I think if
52
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Marcos had not suffered that sickness that early, he would have succeeded
in pushing through his vision of the country … to make this country
great.54
Senator Enrile‟s loyalty, in this way, resembles the brand of loyalty that most of
the pro-Marcos camp maintains. Enrile was Marcos‟s right hand man, he was involved in
almost all facets of Marcos‟s rule, thus, Enrile does not erase the facts of Marcos‟s
corruption or self-interest from his memory. Similarly, others such as Hon. Lazaro and
Atty. Mendoza remain clear eyed about the nature of Marcos‟s regime, but it does not
destroy their intrinsic belief that Marcos is a hero and that he sought to make the
Philippines great.
Asked what he judges Marcos‟s intention in declaring martial law to be, Mendoza
replies, “I think … martial law, [though] initially, was only [enacted] to quell a rebellion
… became an instrument of reform, because of his instant power to enact laws.” 55 Then,
pressed as to whether martial law lasted so long because it became an instrument of
reform, Mendoza admits, “Well, let‟s just say, maybe, [it was also] what he thought …
was necessary to keep [himself] in power.”56 Yet, this realization does not prevent
Mendoza from championing the Marcos years as “the most productive [period] in good
legislation.”57 Mendoza even asserts that, “it‟s … ironic that [Marcos is] called a
dictator.”58 In this way, to those such as Lazaro and Mendoza, Marcos does not need to
be forgiven for his sins and the fact that he committed sins does not negate his greatness.
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Despite his hero status, Marcos cannot be held to unreasonable moral standards,
contradictory to the historical political tradition.

THE NATURE OF POLITICS
Speaking from the staunchly anti-Marcos side, Congressman Teodoro “Teddy
Boy” Locsin, Jr., descendant of a long active political family, a former journalist, a
personal student of President Marcos,59 and a speechwriter for several presidents
beginning with President Corazon Aquino, believes that “Marcos is not the apotheosis of
any system, he was just a guy who took advantage of the sense of limitations of every
other member of the senatorial class.”60 Congressman Locsin elucidates the nature of the
political culture, explaining,
Our political tradition really was that of a senatorial class. There were
families that were in politics and you knew [who they were]. I think they
took advantage of their position more to protect what they had. There were
some families who were clever and were able to take advantage of
national policies like the reparations. The Madrigals may have made a
fortune there, but remember they were not in politics61 … Everyone
waited for his turn in power, but there were things that you did not do to
each other: you never shot each other, you respected each other‟s
privacy.62
The grave toll that the Marcos years took on his family explains Congressman Locsin‟s
position. His is a historically political family, therefore, rather than denouncing the entire
political tradition that his family helped to build, he instead emphasizes its limits. Certain
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rules did govern the political tradition: power tacitly passed back and forth between the
elite factions and killings took place on a local, not national, level, but a true rule of law
did not exist. Marcos thus differed from the rest only in superficial terms, but in kind, he
very much resembles the others of the senatorial class.
Congressman Locsin recounts a story about Jaime “Banjo” Laurel, the son of the
House Speaker Jose Laurel Jr. and the black sheep of the family, who had a “tendency to
shoot people in nightclubs.”63 One day, Jaime Laurel‟s wife was shot dead and the Locsin
family‟s publication Free Press, the oldest political newspaper in the Philippines,
published part one of the story, but Congressman Locsin explains,
[B]efore part two could come out, Speaker Jose Laurel, who was living
two streets away, suddenly shows up at our breakfast table and we‟re
supposed to be going to school, but my father‟s there having breakfast. So
[Laurel] sits down [and eats]. And my father called up the office and said
part two [would] not come out, because you can never attack a man who
breaks bread at your table; that‟s just the way it was before. Sometimes
that‟s good, sometimes that‟s bad, but I think overall it was good because
nobody ever exceeded [his/her] limits. That was all destroyed by Marcos
… [The others] would never dream of doing what he did, because it was
out of the rules … that‟s why he was able to do it. He was able to get
control of the army, he was able to build up a regional officer class –
mostly Ilocanos – isolate the southerners, and lay the groundwork for
military takeover, which is what he did and he destroyed the entire
republican class. In thirteen years64 it disappeared; the children of that
class are not in politics anymore.65
Congressman Locsin also points to several lingering vestiges of this old
republicanism in Ferdinand Marcos. In addition to being a legendary legal mind and
wishing always to portray an appearance of legality to his rule, Congressman Locsin
attests that Marcos continually went through the charade of fake elections, because he
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inherently thought it was improper not to. This was not a move towards more sincere
democracy, merely a superficial observation of tradition. Congressman Locsin further
recounts,
We later found out that he never actually touched the national treasury,
although we overthrew him on that condition, that he was stealing from
the government. He would take kickbacks from Japanese contractors etc.,
but we found out that he didn‟t touch the national treasury, that‟s another
throwback of his, that you use your power to enrich yourself but you never
put your hand in the public till, which is the way it was in the old
Republic.66
Though this may be a specious definition of stealing, Congressman Locsin‟s point only
further reveals Ferdinand Marcos as being within the system, rather than without. Marcos
clearly was not trying to overstep certain traditional boundaries, though pushing the
limits of what had been done before.
Amb. Philip Kaplan, the Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d‟Affaires to the
Philippines‟ U.S. Embassy during the transition after Marcos to the Aquino
administration, once asked President Marcos why he permitted all the corruption in his
government. Kaplan confides that, in summary, Marcos explained that were he to remove
of all of his so-called cronies, his whole support system would break down, and that he
was effectively running a feudal operation.67 Indeed, the former Senate President Jose
Avelino admitted with shocking honesty, “We are not angels! What are we in power for?
When Jesus Christ died on the Cross, He made the distinction between a good crook and
the bad crooks. We can prepare to be good crooks.”68 While serving in her cabinet,
Congressman Locsin says that President Aquino once told him:
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If you‟ve never knelt with a rosary and prayed for every single vote,
thinking you‟ll be cheated, you‟ve never gone door to door begging for a
vote, knowing you couldn‟t buy them all, then you don‟t understand what
we politicians live.69
The Filipino people had no expectation that Ferdinand Marcos would follow the
law. The apotheosis of the system, he extended the law, through complex legal and
political tactics, to expand the definition of the entire political power game. In the
beginning, the public largely supported him, though strong opposition built against him
during his second term. When Marcos eventually declared martial law at the end of his
second term, however, the public thanked him for doing so. The Supreme Court
supported him in this and when he dared further, flagrantly violating the provisions of the
Constitution, they were unable to challenge him. Rather than rejecting him as
overstepping the boundaries of the political tradition, the Court‟s decision extended the
limits to include him. The rule of law had never governed politician‟s actions. The
Supreme Court‟s legitimation only continued to afford Marcos the same protection from
constitutional constraints that previous politicians enjoyed for less excessive violations.
Understanding the nature of Philippine politics requires revising one‟s understanding of
politics altogether, for the government never played by its own rules.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DEFINING HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
AMERICAN COLONIAL POLITICAL TUTELAGE
To expose Marcos as the perfection of the Philippine political tradition requires an
examination of the nature of the system, paying particular attention to its formation and
entrenchment. To this end, academic articles on Philippine politics commonly begin with
acknowledgment and praise of the country‟s long experience with democracy. Paul
Hutchcroft writes, “No country in Asia has more experience with democratic institutions
than the Philippines. Over more than a century … Filipinos know both the promise of
democracy and the problems of making democratic structures work for the benefit of
all.”70 However, Atty. Romulo contests that,
Philippine democracy was always a façade. It worked at first because the
Americans were always around, but it was built on the notion that if you
had elections you had democracy, but the institutions were not there – it
was always patronage. Family loyalty was number one, regional loyalty
was number two – these were vestiges of feudalism … So it really was not
a showcase for democracy, because from the very beginning the values
were imported and didn‟t embed themselves in our culture.71
The former Minister of Education, Culture, and Sports, O.D. Corpuz, extensively
studied Philippine colonial history and his work supports Atty. Romulo‟s view. Corpuz
articulates the dissonance between the “suprastructure” of political values that the U.S.
gave the Philippines and the “infrastructure” of traditional attitudes that the Filipinos
applied to those values:
In the suprastructure the dominant attitudes and values are: a confidence in
the potency of the individual to solve his own problems; a high respect for
individual achievement; stress on technical expertise and impersonal
rationality in the social management of public affairs; and a technique of
70
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enforcing social responsibility through impersonal legal rules. The
infrastructure, on the other hand, has among its components a reliance
upon primary groups, especially kinship groups, in the solution of the
individual‟s problems; a high respect for social status rather than
individual achievement or merit; an emphasis on primary interest-groups
as against the interests of the individual or of the vague national
community; and a style of social morality based on personal, traditional,
or ethical (nonlegal) norms.72
Though there is always a certain disconnect between suprastructure and
infrastructure, the lack of genuine democracy makes the difference between the American
and Filipino cultures staggering and speaks to the difficulties of importing a political
system, as Atty. Romulo notes. To this point, past executive positions in the Philippines
prior to the U.S. influenced 1935 Philippine Constitution indicate that though the
Philippine conception of the presidency was in keeping with that of the Americans, a
separation of powers was not. Filipinos were as yet unaccustomed to separated branches
of government. Filipinos, furthermore, generally distrusted executive power due to their
strong historical reasons for doing so under the Spanish governor-generals who served
the Spanish crown.73
At the beginning of the American colonial period in 1898, the Philippines had no
meaningful experience with national democracy or political parties. The counter-Spanish
revolutionary period produced the Malolos Congress and Malolos Constitution, the latter
of which drew from both the American and English model and was an eighteenth-century
Enlightenment influenced document committed to individual rights according to natural
law.74 William Howard Taft led the Second Philippine Commission,75 establishing a civil
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government in 1901, wherein the commission acted as both the cabinet and legislature
with Taft as the first governor-general of the Philippines.76 President McKinley‟s
“Instructions to the Philippine Commission” hollowly reminded Taft that “The
Commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is
designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands.”77 Notably,
President McKinley also stressed,
The people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there
are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis
of our governmental system … that there are also certain practical rules of
government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of
these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and
these rules of government must be established and maintained in their
islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may
conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are
familiar.78
In practice, the colonists on the ground were in round agreement that the Filipino peoples
were savage and ignorant. Thus, the colonists did not seek the Filipinos‟ consent or aim
to adapt the American governmental system to their customs and traditions.79
The Americans built upon the Spanish governmental institutions and from 19001913, as the first Philippine governor-general, U.S. Secretary of War, and eventually U.S.
President, William Howard Taft supported a “policy of attraction.” This policy awarded
political opportunities to the established economic elite while Taft encouraged the

76

Wurfel, David. Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988: 8.
Castañeda, Anna Leah Fidelis T. “The Origins of Philippine Judicial Review, 1900-1935” Ateneo Law
Journal 46.121 (2001) : 121-156.
78
Ibid., p. 127
79
Ibid.
77

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09

32

American model of strong local government.80 Yet, the economic elite was not
necessarily destined to inherit political prominence. As Benedict Anderson states, “It was
above all the political innovations of the Americans that created a solid, visible „national
oligarchy.‟”81 Taft and other American colonials stated that “the masses [were] ignorant,
credulous, and childlike” and they severely limited suffrage, protected elite dominance,
and opposed potential popular mobilization against their established order.82 In this way,
it was the particular historical circumstances of the American colonial rule, rather than
Philippine culture, that largely determined the subsequent political trajectory.

“A RAPIDLY „FILIPINIZED‟ STATE APPARATUS”
In 1902, Philippine municipal officials elected the provincial governors,
incorporating municipal politics into the larger provincial politics and new, intricate
intraprovincial allegiances formed. In 1907, Taft‟s commission became an appointed
upper house as an elected Filipino legislature came into being, dominated by the newly
created Nacionalista party.83 The electorate was elite and limited, amounting only to 3%
of the population. The U.S. invited males at least twenty-three years of age, who had held
municipal office before August 13, 1898, were literate in Spanish or English, and paid
annual tax or owned at least $230 worth of property, to directly elect their provincial
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governors.84 In doing so, the provincial loyalties and factions grew deeper still, forming
what would become the premise for the later national assembly elections. The U.S.
Congress enacted the Jones Law in 1916 authorizing a bicameral legislature to be elected
by all literate males. Though the legislature was not yet fully elective, the Jones Law did
expand the electorate. By 1920, the American colonists had effectively given up direct
control of the Philippines, but preserved great economic, military, and foreign policy
related influence.85
The political system was extremely exclusive but offered rapidly larger political
positions, however, the American colonists failed to build a strong bureaucracy to
accompany these expanding opportunities. Sidel describes the legislature gaining control
over “a hastily constructed and rapidly „Filipinized‟ national state apparatus.”86 The
colonists focused on holding elections, forming representative institutions, and
mobilizing nascent political parties. Without an effective bureaucracy, however, these
institutions fell prey to the detrimental patronage system of the Philippine provinces.
Sidel cites, moreover, that American colonial officials observed that the municipal police
forces were merely “the political henchmen, and in too many instances the personal
muchachos of the presidentes and local bosses.”87 This situation differs from the regional
advances that took place in other Southeast Asian countries at the time, as in, for
example, Indonesia‟s experience under the Dutch.88 In Indonesia, the Dutch expanded the
state, bureaucratized the apparatus, and centralized the entire governmental system with
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greater tutelage and organization for their colonial subjects. After 1920, however, such
centralization did give way to harsh authoritarianism in Indonesia.
Many Filipinos suffered and fought desperately for independence from Spain.
When the Americans arrived, nationalism had been growing, particularly following the
execution of the independence hero, Jose Rizal. The colonists sought to deafen this
sentiment. Scholar Albert F. Celoza reports, “the display of the Philippine flag was
banned and advocacy of independence was prohibited during the first years of American
occupation, but through theater and music, anti-American feelings were expressed.”89
Atty. Romulo discusses both colonial powers, explaining,
The struggle against Spain – that was genuine, blood was spent there,
many died, many were persecuted – then the Americans came in, who we
thought were liberators, and promptly double-crossed us … The trouble
the Americans brought was [that] – though from a colonial power it [was]
smart – they soon gathered the elite and made them collaborators and with
that retained the old power structure that the Spanish had put in place.
That was anti-democratic, but the colonial administrator is only interested
in pacification. The elite had the power structure to resist [the Americans]
some more if they wanted to, so [the Americans] quickly collared all of
them and made them their own. So you really left a vast number of people
outside of the system, which is the way it has always been even up to
now.90
In this way, the Philippine political system developed, but it never matured past the
impediments that colonialism placed upon it. Rather than building a popular,
representative body to serve the will of the people, the elites further entrenched
government as their exclusive domain.
Taft‟s government successfully dismantled the friar estates, while his civilian
bureaucracy sought to win over the landed elite from their revolutionary fight. Dangling
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the bait of political power did, indeed, successfully enervate Philippine nationalism.
Ultimately, however, the Americans created a political system that catered entirely to the
elite. Collaboration with the Americans cemented the oligarchy‟s power and created a
dependent economic relationship with the U.S. that discouraged Philippine economic
diversification or industrialization.91
The American colonial period did, nevertheless, decouple the Catholic Church
from politics, establish the importance of elections, create a strong presidency, and form
political parties. The institution of a strong presidency resulted from its modeling after
the role of the Commonwealth governor-general, which the first Commonwealth
President, Manuel Quezon, would be able to exploit later in 1935.92 Over time, the
electoral process took root and conferred legitimacy upon the chosen leaders. Until 1901
when the U.S. established a civil government, no political parties had existed.93
According to Wurfel, however, “Indigenous values entered the political process through
parties and elections to a degree not possible in the bureaucracy and other formal
institutions modeled on western lines.”94 The negative consequences of the elitedominated process and the primacy upon kinship ties and patronage would only become
apparent later. It was clear by the 1930s; however, that the party system had,
[M]erely strengthened the political hold of dominant, landed families,
which had used quasi-feudal techniques to gain an electoral following and
could hold national power through a system of one-party dominance. At
the national level, as a result, mass interests could not be articulated.95
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Thus, even when in 1951 the electorate expanded dramatically to 4.7 million registered
voters due to the abolishment of the literacy requirement, as Wurfel writes, “the
dominance of the newly created national oligarchy was so well entrenched that
challenges from below – motivated by deep social injustices – faced monumental
odds.”96
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
PATRONAGE POLITICS
Utang na loob (“the exchange of services and goods between individuals
belonging to two different groups.”97) is the embedded social value of reciprocity that
underlies Philippine culture and has colored much of Philippine politics. Such reciprocity
is evident in underdeveloped, dependent community structures, and due to the halted
development of the Philippines, continues to permeate political interactions there today.
Ambassador Stephen Bosworth comments,
There is a lot about Philippine culture that hasn‟t changed [throughout the
history of the political tradition], the government in place now is evidence
of that.98 The reality of the Philippines is that it is … organized vertically;
people on top take care of the people under them and the people under are
loyal to the people on top. There is very little horizontal organization of
society in the Philippines, so popular action is very difficult to mount. It
happened to some extent in the 1986 revolution in that, that act of getting
rid of Marcos brought together various classes and regions in a way that
hadn‟t happened before ... But Filipino politicians try to take advantage of
this vertical organization; political parties are ineffective and politics tends
to be, by and large, personal- this is a classic example of utang na loob.99
This cycle of favor and debt is the currency for earning a living and socially advancing in
the Philippines, because individuals must trade through the established system in order to
progress.100 Termed “dyadic alliances” in anthropology studies, in 1964 Carl Landé
fleshed out their relevance to the nominal two party system of Philippine democracy. In
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this system, there are no ideological or programmatic differences between parties, merely
rival alliances, which prove to be shallower still given the frequent turncoatism.
Without party loyalty or ideological counterpoints to shape policies, the branches
of government remain truly separated as they are not accountable for leading “responsible
party government” in order to win reelection. This renders the President unable to depend
on legislative support from his party and he/she is thus severely weaker than the
constitutionally vested powers suggest.101 This observation rings true with regards to
Ferdinand Marcos, who easily switched from the Liberal party to the Nacionalista party,
in order to run for president. Such political action further conforms Marcos to the
particular political tradition of the Philippines.
For their part, the electorate does not commit to parties and instead votes
according to personality or loyalty. Eric Gutierrez views this in terms of class, explaining,
Philippine politics has not yet reached that maturity where class interests
are aggregated into political parties … People and political actors down to
the grassroots level, regardless of class origin or interest group, usually
align or identify themselves with political clans that could best dispense
patronage and access to power.102
To this end, Albert Celoza writes, “Campaign slogans [took] the place of policies. Vote
buying and bribery were rampant and worked effectively during elections. Promises of
favors abounded. Pecuniary benefits were enough to induce desired behavior. In an
economy of scarcity, the utmost concern is survival.”103 The majority of the electorate,
however, will understandably have no taste for elevated policies so long as their chief
concern remains daily survival.
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Mary Racelis Hollnsteiner‟s review of local Philippine politics describes the joys
and disappointments that follow municipal elections. She writes that the supporters of the
winning party become utang na loob creditors, collecting their reward.104 The most
vigorous campaigners can relax knowing that no punishment will follow should they
conveniently forget to pay their taxes.105 Then, the opposition predictably accuses the
incumbent party of corruption and abuse of public office for personal and familial gains.
Unfortunately, however, that is precisely what the general public had expected in the first
place.106 Thus, Marcos‟s heightened corruption and cronyism did not break the political
system, but merely confirmed it.

THE FAMILY STATE
Utang na loob may provide the language to explain the political and economic
transactions of the Philippines, but to appreciate the higher order that mandates
Philippine politics, one must recognize the power of the Family State. This cultural lens
forms a large component of the established scholarship on Philippine history and though
essentialist cultural analyses are mostly flawed due to their determinism, the supreme role
that the Philippine family plays is incontestable. Stephen CuUnjieng recounts that while
protesting directly alongside Corazon Aquino, Mrs. Aquino herself, upon realizing who
Stephen CuUnjieng was, asked, “What is he doing here? He should not be here.”107
The CuUnjiengs were not financially, but merely socially, tied to the Marcoses,
thus Stephen CuUnjieng‟s actions did not affect his family‟s welfare. Yet, Mr. CuUnjieng
104
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explains, “The view of right and wrong in this country is only secondarily moral, it‟s
primarily tribal. When I was demonstrating nine out of ten people said „How could you?‟
not because it was wrong, but because my parents were close to Marcos.”108 Therefore,
even Corazon Aquino, who eventually ousted Marcos and championed her cause on
moral grounds, was, herself, unable to place morality above family. Aquino‟s comment
demonstrates the classic Filipino understanding of loyalty, which dictates that, for right or
wrong, it should in all circumstances lie with one‟s family. This particular limitation is
not a product of American colonialism, but a cultural feature that matured under Spanish
colonialism. Spanish familial ties bear a strong resemblance to that of Filipinos, but the
nature of colonialism, with a limited, immature political system ruling a tribal country
based on kinship ties, ultimately made such ties a handicap in the Philippines.
The paradigm of strong families and a weak state traditionally features in much of
the academic scholarship on several Southeast Asian countries and extends to the former
Spanish colonies of Latin America. Jean Grossholtz describes the family unit in the
Philippines to be “the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the
individual and coloring all social activity with its own set of demands.”109 While the
family reliably assures social survival, in the space of a century the Philippines
experienced the tumult of five republics, three empires, and accompanying revolutionary
and World Wars. This instability only further drove Filipino trust away from government.
When the United States awarded the Philippines their long-awaited independence, the
central government failed to seize and defend their power against the muscle of the local
governments who delivered national politicians their votes. The local politicians
108
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effectively became like the warlords that had long ruled the provinces and gained
veritable autonomy while reigning over the provincial population with terror and abuse of
the utang na loob understanding.
Thus, as Alfred McCoy notes, “After generations of experience Filipinos have
learned to rely upon their families for the sorts of social services that the state provides in
many developed nations.”110 In An Anarchy of Families, McCoy highlights the Articles of
the Philippine Civil Code, which express the integral Filipino respect for the family unit.
McCoy also notes the “curiously loving language” of Article 216, which states: “The
family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.”111 Article
219, additionally, delineates the supreme role that family plays in social welfare: “Mutual
aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered among members of the same family.
Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual assistance.”112 The powerful
Catholic Church also has its hand in both politics and social welfare, but it is the family
that “provides employment and capital, educates and socializes the young, assures
medical care, shelters its handicapped and aged, and strives, above all else, to transmit its
name, honor, lands, capital, and values to the next generation.”113
With regards to the elite families114 that monopolize the political and economic
landscape, it is believed that in tandem to wealth and privilege, the succeeding
generations inherit the character and values long associated with their family name.
National trust and respect, therefore, continues through generations alongside control,
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which only further advantages the politicians that descend from the country‟s most elite
brands. Filipinos define family bilaterally rather than patrilinearly, joining a wife‟s family
line to her husband‟s and with each generation the family network and consciousness
only strengthens. This gives rise to the common belief among the elite that “everyone is
related.” Within politics, however, this extensive and flexible familial landscape gives an
impression of volatility, wherein, “elections often assume a kaleidoscopic complexity of
coalition and conflict” concerning factional inter-elite differences.115
Macroscopically, Filipino politics remain steadfast and stable, having resided in
the hands of the elite for over a hundred uninterrupted years. Indeed, Carl Landé writes,
“the two parties were essentially competing factions of actually only one „party‟, a ruling
elite that had the same social conditions, the same political norms and the same programs
of government.”116 With the notable exception of six Democratic Alliance candidates
elected in 1948, nearly all national elected officials from 1946 to Ferdinand Marcos‟s
declaration of martial law in 1972, were from families possessing considerable influence
over local elections in their respective provinces.117 Even the exception proved to be
tragedy. As punishment for the Democratic Alliance officials‟ foolish belief that they too
could take part in politics, Congress expelled them on the grounds of alleged fraud and
campaign violence. More tragic still, in 1948 the Supreme Court upheld their removal
and denied them their seats in the House of Representatives.
The privatization of public resources empowers the dominant political and
economic elite while diminishing the state apparatus and its resources. A legacy of the
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colonial bureaucratic mandates, the weak state provided for the entrenchment of the elite
families in the economy and politics. In particular, this was due to the emasculation of the
central government at the hands of their local counterparts and the growing share of
“rents” within the national economy.118 The theory of rent seeking describes the severe
market entry restrictions and virtual monopolies that the state grants only to the few,
which sparks elite competition or “rent-seeking”.

Due to the colonial context that

established and directed the state‟s evolution, the national government is a feeble
apparatus for economic development, thus rendering it beholden to the rent-seekers that it
caters to.119
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CHAPTER FOUR: PAVING THE ROAD TO MARCOS
PROVIDING FOR MARTIAL LAW
Estado de sitio (state of siege) was the colonial Spanish equivalent of martial law,
though on no occasion was it imposed.120 Neither was it provided for in the Malolos
Constitution of the First Philippine Republic, which only lasted a short six-month run.
Section 21 of the Jones Law was the Philippines‟ true introduction to martial law. Shortly
thereafter, in 1905, Governor-General James F. Smith, under the authority of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, suspended the writ of habeas corpus for the first time in
Philippine history.121 The Jones Law ascribed such powers to the governor-general and
the provision bears nearly the precise language later used in the 1935 Philippine
Constitution‟s Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2:
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof; when the public
safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.122
Unlike the United States, the Philippines explicitly vested this power in the executive. 123
Congressman Locsin reasons that as a new country, the Philippines required more
specific articulation of emergency powers than the U.S. Constitution delineated. 124 As a
consequence, under Ferdinand Marcos, initially it was not that the Supreme Court was
supine, but that in cases of martial law, the judiciary does not enjoy the same prerogatives
as the executive.
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Though there was unanimous support among the 1935 Constitutional Convention
delegates to grant the President the control of the armed forces in the case of danger,
there was serious contention as to whether the power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus should reside with the executive or legislative branch. 125 In 1934 Delegate
Salvador Araneta wished to amend the martial law provision to provide for the National
Assembly to suspend the writ of habeas corpus when public safety required it. He
proposed that the power reside with the President only if the National Assembly is not in
session and a majority of the Supreme Court consents.126
Delegate Araneta warned that the martial law provision as it stood allowed only
the President to determine the existence of “lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
imminent danger thereof.” In addition to the general Philippine distrust of executive
power, Delegate Araneta feared that due to the existing judicial precedents in 1934, the
Supreme Court would be unlikely to review the basis for the President‟s decision to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.127 With regards to Ferdinand Marcos, it seems
Araneta was right to fear the executive‟s abuse of this power. After each suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, beginning in 1905 with Smith, then again in 1953 with
Quirino, and ending in 1971 with Marcos, the Supreme Court sustained the executive‟s
decision. In this way, Marcos‟s relationship with the Supreme Court joins an unbroken
historical precedent in Philippine history. He is not the aberration of the system, but
merely a progression of the political tradition, pushing it still further to achieve truly
executive dominated, personalistic rule.
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THE COMMONWEALTH
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934,
which provided for a ten-year Commonwealth that allowed the U.S. to retain the rights to
emergency intervention, jurisdiction over foreign and defense affairs, as well as the
authority to review Supreme Court rulings. Furthermore, the U.S. required that the
Philippine Constitution be subject to U.S. approval prior to enactment.128 The
Commonwealth was inaugurated on November 15th, 1935, after one year and the easy
acceptance of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, which bore the language and intentions
of the Jones Law and U.S. Constitution.129 Senate President Manuel Luis Quezon was
elected the first Philippine Commonwealth President and Sergio Osmeña the first VicePresident. Congressman Locsin discusses President Quezon‟s post-colonial, political
advantage, recounting,
Not everybody liked him, but he was the one who was charismatic; he
looked white, he looked handsome actually. He could carry the fight for
independence in Washington without looking like an [indio] … These
things matter. A Spanish man looks like an aristocrat; Americans will
listen to an aristocrat. In fact, he wasn‟t, I understand he was poor, but he
looked good. Some of the rich guys around look like natives – that‟s why
he took the leadership; he knew how to deal with the foreigners.130
Remembering the Philippine‟s political tutelage, President Quezon‟s victory is consistent
with the racist sentiments of the past colonial regimes. Under and as a result of
colonialism, those of mestizo (mixed white) blood held greater privileges, respect, and
power.
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Quezon‟s presidency veritably molded the strong executive office, which Marcos
later extended to its extreme conclusion. Quezon enjoyed wildly expansive powers,
which were lifted directly and almost in full from those of the colonial governor-general.
Yet, Quezon had envisioned a strong executive branch even prior to his election and
consistently pushed the constitutional convention to create a stronger president than that
of the White House. While the American president presides over a large federation of
distinct states, in the Philippines, provincial governments possess only delegated
authority and power resides in the national branches. This arrangement naturally creates a
president stronger than its American counterpart.
The 1935 Philippine Constitution ascribed to Quezon “the authority to disapprove
individual items in appropriation bills, discretion over the disbursement of budgeted
funds, and a supervisory control over local government units,” a line item veto that the
U.S. President does not have.131 President Quezon applied his native use of patronage to
national-level government resources and even leveraged his control over regulation
agencies as favors and/or threats. Thus, as was true of Marcos as well as other Philippine
presidents, President Quezon‟s power outstripped even that of the governor-general.
Additionally, Quezon effectively secured the Nacionalista party‟s dominance in the
legislature and dealt with provincial politicians to win local vote banks and outmaneuver
other national politicians. Ultimately, Hutchcroft concludes,
This strange political system, neither centralized nor decentralized, links
powerful presidents and powerful local bosses in a relationship that is both
symbiotic and highly variable … The effect of this system is illustrated in
the fate of the elected administrations that could not afford to alienate the
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local clans that controlled political factions (and often private armies) in
the countryside.132

THE „SPECIAL‟ RELATIONSHIP
A short ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese air force attacked
the American military base, Clark Air Base, in Pampanga, Philippines, banding
Americans and Filipinos together to fight side by side. Eventually, in April 1942 after
less than a year of fighting, the American and Philippine forces surrendered. In 1946,
after the conclusion of World War II, though delayed by a year, the Philippines finally
gained its independence. All grievances against the United States were absolved and a
new tone of gratitude for independence long sought, defense during the war, and a certain
mix of allegiance, reverence, and fondness shaped Philippine feelings towards the U.S.
and the future of their “special” relationship.
John T. Sidel and other students of Philippine history suggest that the Filipinos
didn‟t shed enough blood; that independence was granted too easily. Sidel argues that as
a result, “potentially „state-building‟ phases of armed mobilization and military
consolidation (caudillismo), as occurred in many former colonies during national
revolutions, were preempted by the American intervention (in 1898-1901 and 194546).”133 Stanley Karnow, the American author who won a Pulitzer Prize for In Our
Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines, notes,
Filipinos also recoil from tarnishing their nationalist image by too close an
association with the Americans. They seem to be trapped in a tangle of
contradictions. History is responsible. Despite their own vague past, the
132

Hutchcroft, Paul D. and Joel Rocamora. “Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and
Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines.” Journal of East Asian Studies 3 (2003) : 259-292.
133
Sidel, John T. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999: 18.
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09

49

Filipinos might have forged their national personality had they been
compelled to fight for freedom – as they were indeed doing in their
conflict against Spain. By acceding to their aspirations for sovereignty so
soon after conquest, the United States spared them a long struggle for
independence. But, in a sense, their hopes were fulfilled too easily.
America‟s acquiescence to their ambitions deflated the élan of their early
nationalism, leaving them confused and ambivalent. From then on, their
attitudes toward the United States vacillated between imitation and
resentment, subservience and defiance, adulation and contempt, love and
hate.134
Ambassador Bosworth reacted to Karnow‟s position, asserting,
We had no choice, we had to give the Philippines independence, we were
already late because of the war, we had committed to giving it earlier.
Americans were never fully comfortable with their colonial position in the
Philippines or anywhere else; we were a colony and didn‟t like it and the
feeling was that it was immoral for us to be a colonial power.135
This perspective completely ignores the complexities of the situation on the ground.
Spanish colonialism severely stunted the Philippines‟ growth and when the United States
swept in, though harsh to declare that, “their hopes were fulfilled too easily,” the
Filipinos hadn‟t yet completed the lessons that a nation learns from the struggle for selfrule. The United States had the, admittedly dubious, luxury of coming of age during the
struggle for independence from Britain, which the Philippines did not. Therefore, when
the U.S. immediately placed the Philippines on a path to self-rule, without adequate or
long-term minded political tutelage, it may have been in keeping with her principles, but
it ignored the nation-building responsibilities she held as a colonial power.
Similarly, Ambassador Philip Kaplan also agrees with this, Ambassador
Bosworth‟s, position on the colonial role of the U.S., asking of Karnow:
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What would he have us do after World War II? After [General] Macarthur
came back? But Filipinos took over their own destiny and it wasn‟t easy.
We were there to help. At the time the Philippines was the third or fourth
largest aid recipient, after Israel and Palestine, which were in a class of
their own, next was Turkey, and then it was the Philippines.136
Ambassador Kaplan is also quick to point out the pro-American sentiment in the
Philippines, which after World War II, with the exception of the late 1960s and 1970s,
during the Vietnam War, has been louder and more enduring. Ambassador Kaplan
recounts,
I spent all my diplomatic life with allies, I was part of the Cold War effort,
and I was never in a country that was as pro-American as the Philippines. I
think he over-stated the basic equation and [it] doesn‟t conform to my
experience. I‟ve represented the Philippine government from this law firm,
I‟ve just made my fortieth trip to the Philippines, I‟ve probably visited
more than any other American, and from a cold eyed perspective I don‟t
recognize this. It wasn‟t [as such] even with the most nationalist people,
[with whom] my personal relationships … were always extremely cordial
… My wife went down to the embassy one day and there were people with
signs that said „Yankee go home,‟ but underneath it said „and take me with
you.‟ The relationship with the population as a whole was good. The U.S.
was seen as a force to assist them in restoring democracy.137
Nevertheless, this pro-American sentiment was not a result of American colonialism,
which embittered many Filipinos towards the U.S. Rather, it took shape only after
fighting alongside the U.S. in World War II and as a result of the “special relationship”
between the two countries after the war.
When presented the same quote, Atty. Romulo easily agreed with Karnow‟s
statement, as do many Filipino intellectuals and professionals, save for the politicians
who either do not or may not support the idea that “their hopes were filled too easily.”
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One such politician, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Marcos‟s right-hand man, reacted quite
strongly to Karnow‟s statement, arguing,
I don‟t think the people who loved our country were ashamed to associate
with the Americans simply because they are Nationalist; I think we are
enlightened enough [not to] … I don‟t think I can agree with that
statement. Of course some people didn‟t want to be identified too closely
with the Americans because at that time there was a growing feeling of
anti-Americanism in the Philippines, so for political purposes they didn‟t
want to be called American stooges.138
The heart of Senator Enrile‟s political career took place in a much more anti-American
Philippines, the resentment of which remains with him still today. It is undeniable that the
Philippines is largely, as Ambassador Kaplan attests, strikingly pro-American. Though
interrupted by flashes of anti-American fashion, year after year Filipinos dream of
moving to or visiting the United States and greatly idolize American culture, despite their
colonial history. This demonstrates that, for the most part, the Philippines has come to
view the U.S. not as their former colonial ruler, but their ally and mentor.
Tensions do remain, though they were much stronger in the beginning of the
Marcos years due to the U.S.‟s Cold War role and the lingering vestiges of colonialism.
In particular, the latter centered on the military bases and parity rights agreements, which
incited deep anger in Filipinos. Atty. Romulo also admits, however, that,
There is that favorite theory that not enough blood was spent insofar as the
Americans are concerned. I don‟t think [we] can say we truly had a war …
[or] a real armed resistance against the Americans, though the only reason
we had to give up was … no one was supplying us with arms from the
outside to fight this new colonial empire coming in.139
The contours of such a special relationship were very much complicated and defined by
the American colonial political tutelage. Though Mrs. Marcos feels deep respect and
138
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kindness towards the U.S., there are still grudges that qualify her friendship. Mrs. Marcos
complains, “We had no real freedom, we were only free to befriend the friends of
America.”140

MARCOS‟S PREDECESSOR
At the close of World War II and with full grasp of their sovereignty and destiny,
the Philippines elected Manuel A. Roxas to be president in 1946. President Roxas was an
ardent American advocate who negotiated the PI-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the
Military Bases Agreements, however, he died after two years in office. 141 Vice-President
Elipidio Quirino finished Roxas‟s term as president and began the struggle against the
Communist insurgency in the Philippines, fighting the evolved Hukbo ng Bayan Laban
sa Hapon (“Army of the People Against the Japanese”), which had transformed into the
Communist Party of the Philippines‟ new military wing.142 The struggle against the
Communists, like that against the Muslim separatists in the South of the Philippines,
continues even after Marcos. Marcos‟s political struggles, in this way, only further
entrench him in what are consistent cycles within Philippine history.
President Quirino was elected in 1950 and though his term was wild with graft,
corruption, and electoral fraud, he is most remembered for his decision to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus. President Quirino issued Proclamation 220 on October 22nd, 1950,
in an effort to fight the Huk rebellion. This action came directly after the collapse of a
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brief truce that the government had negotiated with the Huk leader, Luis M. Taruc.143
President Quirino‟s suspension met widespread criticism and outrage despite the fact that
the 1935 Philippine Constitution explicitly provided for the suspension as a corollary to
martial law in Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2. In August of 1952, the Supreme
Court ruled in Montenegro v. Castañeda, that the suspension was, indeed, constitutional.
Marcos was, in this way, the last in a line of strong, post-colonial presidents, each of
whom strengthened the executive branch alongside a weaker, complicit judicial branch.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Barcelon v. Baker in 1905, the Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the validity
of the governor-general‟s basis for suspending the writ of habeas corpus and, more
importantly, established the suspension of that writ as a political question over which the
Supreme Court does not have judicial review. Montenegro v. Castañeda in 1953 echoed
the language of Barcelon v. Baker, using the judicial precedent set in 1905 as the basis
for the decision in favor of President Quirino. In Barcelon v. Baker, the Supreme Court
ruled that, “The findings of the executive upon which he bases his order suspending the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus are conclusive and final upon the Courts.”144
As it would in the subsequent investigations of the colonial period,
Commonwealth period, and beyond, the Supreme Court “terminated” its investigation,
bowing to the executive as “the sole and exclusive judge” as to whether a state of
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“invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof” existed.145 Presidential
Legal Counsel and Lawyer for the Office of Government Corporate Council under
Marcos, Hon. Manuel “Lolong” Lazaro, justifies this, explaining,
[The Supreme Court] cannot inquire into the wisdom. They can rule on the
legality, but not on the wisdom of his acts … The only one who would
know the wisdom of what he is doing … is the President … The judiciary
… can only know [the] facts that are presented to the court; other facts
[that are] not presented they are not privy to.146
The Philippine courts had been reviewing the validity of the acts of the legislature
and executive branches of the American colonial period‟s Insular Government long
before the concept of judicial review first gained expression in organic law. 147 Anna
Castañeda, a Philippine legal history scholar, explains,
When Congress transplanted provisions of the U.S. Constitution to the
Islands, it also transplanted the interpretation given these provisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court through its power of judicial review. The broader
grant of oversight power to the U.S. Supreme Court … facilitated tutelage
in U.S. jurisprudence.148
Formally, it was Article VIII, Sec. 2, Paragraph 1 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution that
granted the judiciary jurisdiction over “all cases in which the Constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question.”149
Jose A. Angara petitioned in the 1936 case Angara v. Electoral Commission, for
a writ of prohibition to restrain the Electoral Commission from acting upon the protest
filed by Pedro Ynusa to bar Angara from taking office in the National Assembly. Though
the details of the case are not otherwise relevant here, Justice Jose Laurel‟s 1936 decision
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became the landmark definition of judicial review. Speaking to a separation of powers,
Laurel wrote, “In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only Constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof.”150 Castañeda
observes, however, “the bold and confident assumption by the Commonwealth Supreme
Court of its role as the „final arbiter‟ was in stark contrast to its origins.”151 Castañeda
explains,
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was neither so quick nor so
eager to seize upon the opportunity to exercise its judicial prerogatives, be
it to strike down legislation that violated individual rights or to play
gatekeeper to the Executive and Legislative departments of the Insular
Government. Indeed, early enunciations of the doctrine of judicial review
display restraint and deference.152
Therefore, the later Supreme Court‟s passive deference to the executive and legislature
had its roots in the American colonial period. The Supreme Court‟s legitimation of and
submission to Marcos‟s rule, should, therefore, come as no surprise. Supreme Court
deference to the wisdom of the executive branch appears to be characteristic to the
historical Philippine political tradition.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE RISE OF FERDINAND MARCOS
DEMANDS FROM BELOW
The second World War severely impacted the Philippines, but with the close of
the war came genuine self-autonomy for the Philippines. Furthermore, between
independence in 1946 and Marcos‟s declaration of martial law in 1972, the Philippines‟
state and society developed and modernized quite significantly. The national government
budget of 78 million pesos grew over 800 percent in constant pesos between 1930 and
1960. The budget more than doubled by 1972 and reached 4.03 billion pesos. The
number of government employees, which had totaled 29,420 in 1930, also rose
dramatically due to the strong public demand for government jobs. The new figure
totaled to over 500,000 government employees in 1972. In fact, while the Philippine
population had grown roughly 100 percent between 1930 and 1960, the number of
government employees rose 1100 percent over the same period. 153
Filipinos of the late 1960s and early 1970s were markedly dissimilar to those who
lived under American colonial rule. Relieved of foreign tutors and constraints, Filipinos
enjoyed an emancipated politics, grew reliant on a stable constitutional framework, and
experienced increased political mobilization with the rise of organized interest groups in
the 1950s and 1960s. Though politics was still firmly elite-dominated, Filipinos had
become more educated and informed. In 1939, 1 percent of homes had radios and 43
percent of the population was literate. By 1968 over 60 percent of homes had radios and
by 1970, 83 percent of the population was literate. 154 Accordingly, the more aware and
articulate populace increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with the elite-run, but
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purportedly democratic, state. Riding the 1960s‟ global progressive movement, peasants
in the Philippines advocated for agricultural reform and militant political mobilization
against their former patrons. Meanwhile, Congressional economic nationalists blocked
foreign investment.155
With great foresight, Senator Jovito Salonga declared in a speech to the League of
Women Voters of the Philippines in 1964:
[D]emocracy is on trial. It will face a greater crisis in the coming years.
The “revolution of rising expectations” will mount with ever-increasing
intensity. Popular education, the accelerated tempo and volume of mass
instruments of communication … the sharpening appeal of mass
advertisements – all these create wants and needs unknown to our
forefathers … The problem of massive poverty, of the deterioration of
morale in public service, the lack of social discipline … the increasing
incidence of graft, the lack of respect for law and authority, and the
revolution of rising frustrations … What can be done, what is needed? ...
We need strong leaders … but they must be leaders devoted to the ideals
of a free society … strong leaders can easily become brutal, savage
despots.156
Rural and radical urban protest, thus, forced elected officials to hear the demands of the
people. Therefore, in 1971, Congress finally responded to the calls of the Federation of
Free Farmers for improvements to the land reform legislation. In a few scattered
municipalities, additionally, the local elections of 1971 replaced established political
family leaders with representatives from the new reform groups.157 After the late 1960s
and early 1970s, appealing to the powerless, disadvantaged masses was mandatory for all
political platforms.
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THE RISE OF FERDINAND MARCOS
Ferdinand Marcos had become the leader of the Liberal Party in the House of
Representatives by 1957 and he quickly set his eyes on a seat in the Senate. Meanwhile,
Vice-President Diosdado Macapagal, who courted U.S. government representatives, had
been secretly feeding political information to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
for years. The agency had vigorously supported Macapagal‟s bid for vice-president.158
Later, the CIA attempted to form a coalition under a splinter party called the
Progressives. The coalition paired Vice-President Macapagal with other Liberals who
were friendly to the CIA, among them Ferdinand Marcos. In 1959 this “Grand Alliance”
produced a slate of senatorial candidates to oppose those of President Garcia‟s, which
would pave the road for Macapagal‟s eventual presidency.159 Infighting ultimately
destroyed the Grand Alliance, and among their conflicts was whether or not Ferdinand
Marcos should be allowed to run for Senate.
Seagrave reports that, “nobody trusted him.” He explains,
Leaders of the Progressive party were afraid of him, convinced he was the
most dangerous man in the legislature. Among his peers he had a
reputation for cutthroat tactics that frightened even the corrupt old lions in
Congress.160
It seems that from the beginning, Marcos was the more extreme product of the political
tradition. Seagrave gives the example of when a Central Bank official refused to
authorize an import permit for an important Chinese businessman. This led Marcos to
“burst into his office waving a revolver and pointed the muzzle at his head until the
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documents were signed and turned over to him.”161 The bank official resigned later that
day, took his family, and emigrated to the United States.
There were other victims of Marcos‟s violent threats, but most were too scared to
complain, choosing simply to emigrate instead. Indeed, there was little recourse for
political victims, because such coercive and threatening tactics, though more overt with
Marcos, existed throughout the government. Reports from the late 1950s revealed that the
families of Marcos‟s victims were at times kidnapped and placed under solitary
confinement until their husbands conceded to Marcos‟s desires. According to Seagrave,
however, “these reports were not discussed openly because the victims were afraid to
complain.”162 There was, thus, natural fear within Congress as to what would happen if
Marcos were to gain more power, particularly given his confessed intention to become
president.

VYING FOR PRESIDENT
Not only did Ferdinand Marcos win election to the Senate, but in April 1963 he
also became president of the Senate. This particularly powerful position awarded Marcos
control of the military budget, among other responsibilities. It was during this time that
Marcos arranged for himself twenty war medals, with a string of affidavits as
justification.163 Moreover, “officers in the armed forces fell over each other to fawn on
him. Careers were advanced. Ilocano officers rose fast in the army, and the

161

Ibid.
Ibid.
163
Ibid., 171.
162

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09

60

Constabulary.”164 Through favors, patronage, and the creation of national standing,
Ferdinand Marcos advanced fast along the path to Malacañang Palace. Marcos
recognized the need to inhabit the system and become part of it, which is why he took the
pains to build up enough clout, fear, and honor, so as to equal that of the elite leaders he
competed against.
Ferdinand Marcos‟s 1965 bid for the presidency took place amid the accelerated
reformist rallies and demonstrations of Liberal Party President, Diosdado Macapagal‟s,
third year as president.165 At the time, Ferdinand Marcos was the Senate president as well
as president of the Liberal party, but in a recurring maneuver of Philippine politics,
Marcos switched to the Nacionalista party – and received no retribution – in order to
capture the nomination and challenge the incumbent. Amb. Philip Kaplan describes
Ferdinand Marcos, recounting, “He was a complicated man; he was the smartest Filipino
I‟ve ever met, not as an intellectual, but he was very agile on his feet … a very good
politician.”166

NINOY AQUINO
Ferdinand Marcos and Sen. Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. were the two political
heavyweights of the time, famed for their formidable intelligence and keen political
sensibilities. As Stephen CuUnjieng reflects, “[Ferdinand Marcos] was a completely
different breed, the only rival to him was Ninoy. Ninoy was the only one who could, with
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cold blooded political skill, still approach Marcos.”167 This matching of giants was the
running thread throughout the Marcos years. Ninoy Aquino was the symbol of the
opposition and Marcos‟s only serious and constant threat.

Aquino, thus, became

Marcos‟s obsession.
Born in 1932, when Ninoy Aquino ran for mayor of Tarlac he was underage for
the office. But, he would be 22 by the time he took his oath, so the courts allowed him to
run. This precise situation recurred when he ran for the Senate. Ferdinand Marcos‟s last
constitutional term should have ended in 1973 and before ultimately deciding to declare
martial law, Marcos had considered setting up Imelda Marcos to run for president.
Senator Ninoy Aquino, however, would be 41 years old and eligible to run, and in no
way could Mrs. Marcos mount a challenge to Aquino. Expectedly, upon declaring martial
law in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos immediately jailed Senator Ninoy Aquino. Sitting in jail,
Aquino would steady himself, assured that because he was 15 years younger than
Marcos, his time would come and that he need just be patient and wait.168

MR. AND MRS. MARCOS
In the 1965 presidential campaign, above even his medals, Imelda Romualdez
Marcos was Ferdinand‟s greatest political asset. Ferdinand Marcos first saw Imelda
Romualdez in 1955 and married her but eleven days after their first meeting. She was the
1950s encapsulation of Filipina beauty, but better yet, she was a Romualdez, albeit from
the less prestigious side. The Romualdez family was a political family from the South, an
irresistible counterpart to Marcos‟s Northern family. Ferdinand Marcos could hope to
167
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draw an intersectional base of support with Imelda and he also stood to gain further
standing due to the elite Romualdez family name. Mr. and Mrs. Marcos made an
astoundingly charismatic couple that both instinctively played to and successfully
captured the hearts of Filipinos.
Filipinos famously love entertainment and showmanship – song, dance, and
romance – they fall in love with the darlings of the silver screen and actors often run for
office and easily win. Ferdinand Marcos, though portrayed in America as courageous
and, interestingly, “cute,” was always portrayed in the Philippines as the athletic,
dynamic man on horseback. Furthermore, Atty. Romulo recalls,
Imelda … was just the right person for this kind of system … which is a
little Peronista … She‟s glamorous, she has presence … She knew how to
manipulate the public. And charming - the woman could sing! So with the
hell campaigning against someone as dour as Macapagal and as ugly as
Eva169, well [there was] no competition and, again, Marcos was
charismatic … he had leadership.170
Such statements speak to the inherent hollowness of the Philippine political tradition,
wherein, as Congressman Locsin intimates from his own experience, “the quality of your
looks is anywhere from 50-30 million pesos worth of campaigning.”171 However, given
that politics is merely an elite game, which fails to meaningfully include the larger
population, one can hardly begrudge the voters such superficiality.
President Macapagal was of humble origins, which effectively won over the more
empowered general populace; however, his ineffectual administration was rife with graft
and corruption. According to Seagrave, however, nobody wanted to run on Ferdinand
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Marcos‟s ticket. Mrs. Marcos tearfully begged Fernando Lopez,172 who had lost the
nomination for president, to be her husband‟s vice-president. He finally consented, after
which Imelda immediately produced a document for Lopez to sign and flashed him a
huge smile.173 Imelda Marcos also formed a group of twenty-five young, wealthy,
socialite women called the “Blue Ladies.” Their campaign responsibilities were to lavish
attention on foreign journalists and host Tuesday and Friday political teas.174
Much of the public assumed that, after giving up on Vice-President Emmanuel
Pelaez‟s presidential candidacy, the CIA was working to support Marcos. Ferdinand
Marcos had been friendly to the CIA since his early days as a Congressman. 175 The
intelligence organization seemed to be bolstering his reception abroad, as they had done
for Diosdado Macapagal and Ramon Magsaysay, who was President from 1953-1957.
Indeed, warm and excessive foreign media coverage of Philippine politics was often an
indicator of CIA involvement.176 Seagrave notes, “In cover stories and feature articles
[Marcos] was portrayed as an authentic war hero, recipient of the U.S. Medal of Honor,
and one whom America could depend upon to preserve democracy with his very life. The
articles were almost without exception uncritical.”177 In the end, Marcos and Lopez
defeated Macapagal in the 1965 election by 670,000 votes.178 Ferdinand had campaigned
furiously with Mrs. Marcos and they formed a vigorous, youthful pairing: the political
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star and an innocent, provincial beauty queen. Marcos‟s anti-corruption stance also won
over the Philippine electorate as did his slogan “This nation can be great again.”179

THE FIRST TERM
As President, Ferdinand Marcos empowered the civilian bureaucracy and
military. He placed them under his direct authority and increased their resources, which
he then made readily available to himself.180 Congressman Locsin provides an analysis as
to how Marcos built up his military power. He relates that Marcos‟s strategy was to
recruit officers from his home province to ensure top-level loyalty, but fill his infantry
with the more experienced fighters, accustomed to fighting terrorist or separatist Muslims
in the South of the Philippines. Locsin explains,
He concentrated on Iloilo, injecting the Ilocanos181 into the officer class.
That‟s something that‟s easy to do because Ilocanos are basically
hardworking and poor and there‟s the [physical] proximity to the
Philippine Military Academy. The southerners are actually, so I‟m told,
better fighters in the field … they [a]re always in conflict with Muslims.
But, Marcos knew what to do: get your southern soldiers, infantry, but the
officers are all from the north and they‟re the ones who command the
divisions. He set that military stage. And then, the communists really
helped.182
Congressman Locsin thus draws attention to the fact that not only does power flow from
wealth, but it also accompanies a monopoly of violence and protection, especially during
times of crisis. Being a military man, Ferdinand Marcos never underestimated this second
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component, for even if power did not directly flow from it, military support could at the
least defend his power.
President Fidel V. Ramos reflected on Ferdinand Marcos‟s early presidency and
notes,
During [Marcos‟s] first term, if you will recall, he [conducted] the miracle
rise … He did the infrastructure program, connecting the Philippines as
much as possible and putting the Philippines on a proper economic path.183
Marcos dedicated his first term to his infrastructure program, the legacy of which still
remains today. The pro-Marcos camp often cite this as an example of the direction and
progress that Marcos ushered in, while the anti-Marcos camp respectfully acknowledges
the impact that the infrastructure had in the Philippines. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile lauds
Marcos‟s program achievements, noting,
Everything that we see today: roads, irrigation systems, even the rural
electrification of the country, including the introduction of failed nuclear
power system – failed [due to] the succeeding administration, not …
Marcos – and all the modernization that you see here, the starting point of
the modernization of our metropolis, the highways that you are seeing
now, were products of the Marcos regime.184
The literature also uniformly marvels at what Atty. Romulo describes to be
Ferdinand Marcos‟s knack for “putting the right people in the right places.” These were
the so-called technocrats of the Marcos years, the exemplar of which was Cesar Virata,
the Finance Minister under President Marcos.185 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, a
Supreme Court Justice under President Corazon Aquino, confirms, “I‟ve mentioned …
several times about Marcos‟s ability to choose administrators of some level of honesty
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and pretty good level of confidence, the archetypal example of this is Cesar Virata,
Vicente Paterno … Gerardo Sikat.”186 For his part, Cesar Virata explains,
Marcos selected a very good Cabinet … [Y]ou ask many people and [they
agree] he really had a very good cabinet. His main instruction to us [was]:
do your best in your own field, you let me know what you think is the best
decision, and let me think about the political consequences of your
decision, because we were not politicians … So, in a way he [was] really
intellectually bright [in] that he can respond to you and give you
[recommendations] that will make [decisions] more palatable politically,
but [while still having] the same effect.187
Despite the many improvements, however, Marcos‟s administration suffered from the
chronic ills of runaway inflation, unemployment, and corruption, and gave rise to
unprecedented vocal popular dissent.188
The midterm election of 1967 greatly strengthened the Nacionalista party
presence in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. In 1967, however, the
Liberal Party senator, Ninoy Aquino, also won office.189 In a 1968 article in Foreign
Affairs, Aquino wrote about the Philippines as a land of “traumatic contrasts,” charging,
Here is a land where freedom and its blessings are a reality for a minority
and an illusion for the many. Here is a land consecrated to democracy but
run by an entrenched plutocracy. Here, too, are a people whose ambitions
run high, but whose fulfillment is low and mainly restricted to the selfperpetuating elite. Here is a land of privilege and rank – a republic
dedicated to equality but mired in an archaic system of caste.190
Like Marcos, Senator Aquino recognized the need to champion the interests of the
masses, if not in earnest at least in rhetoric. Despite the lack of drastic improvement to
these basic societal flaws, which Marcos had campaigned to fix, he won reelection in
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1969 in an infamous campaign, steeped in electoral fraud and terrorism.191 Not long after
beginning his first term, Marcos had already toyed with the idea of amending the official
two term presidential limit set in the 1935 Constitution. Such early plotting should be
taken in light of the fact that, at this point, no incumbent president had ever even won
reelection.192
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CHAPTER SIX: CRISIS MODE
1969 AND THE SECOND TERM
Despite the economic crisis that ravaged the Philippines from 1967 to 1968, in
1969, President Marcos ran the most expensive election campaign in Philippine history
and used government funds to do so. He would take no chances on the 1969 election,
which was a contest of personality, coercion, and patronage, with fraud, intimidation,
violence, stolen ballot boxes, and pork barrel distributed to officials at the village level.
Luckily for Marcos, the opposition was unable to produce a competitive candidate to
oppose him; Senator Aquino was still too young. The Liberal party nominated the
Cebuano Senator Sergio Osmeña Jr., the son of the former President Osmeña, alongside
the brother of the former President Magsaysay, who was Osmeña‟s vice-president.
President Marcos even went so far as to set aside departmental budgetary funds to
support friendly politicians‟ congressional campaigns and to fund his own patronage
distributions.193
Marcos portrayed himself as a nationalist and campaigned on the platform of
greater independence from the United States, promising a renegotiation of the U.S.
military air bases and accusing Osmeña of collaboration with the Japanese.
Unfortunately, Marcos‟s exorbitant campaign spending plunged the Philippine economy
further into crisis. He left the national treasury struggling to pay a daunting foreign debt
and wild trade deficit, having bled it dry of all foreign exchange reserves.194 By 1970, the
demonstrations, rallies, walkouts, sit-ins, teach-ins, and the like, reached a new
calamitous height. Demanding societal reform, the protesters denounced the United
193
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States,195 President Marcos, “fascism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism,” and
created a veritable “parliament of the streets.”196

UPRISINGS AND DEMOCRACY AS REVOLUTION
Fierce reaction to the 1969 election accompanied the other general calls for
reform. The 1969 and early 1970 student protests, especially the “Battle of Mendiola” on
January 30th, 1970 when hordes of students attempted to march on Malacañang Palace,
brought about the eventual attempt for constitutional reform that would occur in
November, 1970.197 Marcos was also able to manipulate the restless revolutionary
atmosphere to his own ends. After their dissolution, following the Huk rebellion that led
President Quirino to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in 1950, the Communist Party reestablished itself in December of 1968. Subsequently, their military arm, The New
People‟s Army (NPA), emerged just a few months later on March 29th, 1969. They
mobilized out of their shared belief with Mao Zedong that “political power grows out of
the barrel of a gun.”198 Ultimately, this provided Marcos with the same justification for
suspending the writ of habeas corpus that President Quirino gave 21 years before. First,
however, in a brilliant political tactic, Marcos began by excoriating the oligarchs and
blaming them for the Philippine‟s problems to defuse the radical militarism and social
criticism mounted against him.
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Isabelo T. Crisostomo, a strong Marcos supporter in 1973, reflects on the effect
that public demonstrations had on President Marcos. Crisostomo charts Marcos‟s
evolution into a “revolutionary,” which ultimately led him to declare martial law and
champion his “New Society” program. Crisostomo pinpoints the public uprising as the
starting point for Marcos, who had said that demonstrations “strengthen the hand of any
man who wants to reform government.”199 Crisostomo writes,
Marcos himself knew democracy in the Philippines had not been as
successful as it should be. It had been a failure because it had not been
flexible enough to allow the great majority of the people to share and
enjoy the privilege and power monopolized by a well-entrenched
oligarchy … He must offer the people a better alternative to lure them
away from the Communists. That alternative was democracy itself, but
democracy transformed.200
On January 25th, 1971, therefore, Marcos launched the “Democratic Revolution,” which
Crisostomo hails as “a revolution unique in history because it was to be constitutional,
legal and within the framework of democracy.”201
Surveying the thousands of Filipinos gathered outside Congress that day,
desperate for change, Marcos said, “They demand a revolution in the tradition of our
democracy. They fight a democratic revolution.”202 Crisostomo adeptly perceives that,
“By thus identifying the revolution as democratic, Marcos succeeded, in one master
stroke, in isolating the Communists from the rest of the revolutionaries, the great majority
of whom were not ideologues.”203 Then to the joint session of Congress, President
Marcos announced,
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I come to speak of a society that is sick, so sick that it must either be cured
now or buried in a deluge of reforms … For survival is no longer enough
for our people … When the „economic royalists‟ prove to be insatiable,
when they use the combination of media and economic power to coerce
and intimidate the duly elected leaders of the people and to advance their
privileges and financial gains, there is no course left but to eradicate
them.204
From there, President Marcos, Crisostomo summarizes,
[P]rescribed an immediate reexamination of the postulates of Philippine
society: the ownership of land, the place of the worker in industry in terms
of security and dignity, the re-creation of an exploitative society into a
cooperative one, and the broadening of the nation‟s horizons in the world
community.205
Such revolutionary talk fell in line with the demands of the people, but the
specific targeting of Marcos‟s criticism proved such overtones to be insincere. In
particular, the Lopez family bore the brunt of Marcos‟s criticism, due to the scathing and
courageous anti-Marcos editorials they printed in the Manila Chronicle. Even before the
“Democratic Revolution,” Vice-President Fernando Lopez resigned as secretary of
agriculture on January 14th, 1971.206
Marcos had long envied the wealth and prestige of the Lopez family and had eyed
their Manila Electric Company (Meralco). He therefore investigated Meralco as well as
the other Lopez family holdings. After declaring martial law in 1972, the government
took over the Lopez enterprise, but not all of the entrenched oligarchy suffered under
Marcos. In keeping with the nature of past Philippine politics, Marcos could not afford to
alienate all of the business elite. So, he chose his victims carefully and destroyed only
those families he perceived to be a threat to him.
204
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THE CONCON
The Philippines turned to the November 1970 constitutional convention (the
“ConCon”) to correct electoral evils, social injustice, heavy consolidation of power under
Marcos, and the influence of partisan politics in all government decisions.207 The
delegates contemplated switching to the parliamentary system as the remedy. Given the
nearing end of his second term, Marcos saw this as an opportunity to constitutionally
prolong his stay in power. Indeed, later generations of frustrated Filipinos and power
hungry Presidents208 have again considered this solution to repair the political system and
retain power, respectively, though to no avail. In 1970 there was also the deeper, general
feeling that the time had come to replace the colonial 1935 Constitution. According to the
ConCon‟s secretary-general, Jose Abueva, there were varied efforts by politicians to stall
and end the idea of a constitutional convention. He credited student activist pressure for
the fact that it was convened at all.209 With regards to electoral reform, the revision of the
laws increased the secrecy of the ballot, which was a welcome and needed change.
Making it more difficult for politicians to track how their supporters voted, however,
merely encouraged politicians to resort to more violent coercion and to paying off
potential opposition voters.210
The election of ConCon delegates was one of the most peaceful and fair elections
in Philippine history and succeeded in stirring a striking amount of debate on the
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issues.211 The majority of the delegates favored retaining a presidential system, wished to
strengthen local governments, and opposed allowing either Ferdinand or Imelda Marcos
to continue in office past the convention.212 The “ban the Marcoses” resolution stipulated
that no president, former president, nor any of their close relatives be eligible for
executive office under the new constitution. According to the 1935 Constitution,
President Marcos‟s final term had to end in 1973. Prior to the convention, Marcos had
already frequently stated that Mrs. Marcos may one day have to run in order “to save the
country from communism.”213 Unless, of course, the ConCon decided to switch to a
parliamentary system, which President Marcos supported, and under which he hoped to
become prime minister.
Despite the outward appearance that Marcos had no friends within the ConCon,
he was able to exert considerable influence over the internal deliberations. Wurfel
reports,
According to a young attorney at Malacañang who later defected,
presidential staffers in 1971 had been assigned to identify the „needs‟ of
delegates and then to provide them with governmental loans, civil service
appointments for friends and relatives, special clearance through customs,
and so forth.214
By 1972, the Marcoses adopted more direct tactics and even handed out envelopes of
cash to pliable delegates. Eduardo Quintero, an elder delegate, was so appalled by this
behavior that he exposed President Marcos‟s underhanded dealings on the convention
floor. The press and public were infuriated and demanded the expulsion of the delegates
that Quintero had named. When this didn‟t happen, public respect for the ConCon all but
211
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vanished.215 As the ConCon deliberations dragged on, President Marcos was losing time
if he was going to prolong his stay in power.

PLAZA MIRANDA- THE LAST STRAW
During the middle of the Constitutional Convention, on August 21st, 1971, Plaza
Miranda was bombed. The plaza was a symbol of free expression, located in Quiapo
district and contained by the Shrine of Jesus Christ, the Black Nazarene, and the Quiapo
Church, which flanked the plaza. It was a busy downtown square and the site of frequent
demonstrations and protests.216 The Liberal Party was holding a rally for the midterm
election, featuring eight senatorial candidates, when two grenades suddenly appeared on
stage, killing eleven people and injuring ninety more. The prominent Liberal Party
senators weren‟t spared and even Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and Gerardo Roxas
were severely injured. President Marcos‟s reaction was strong and swift. He denounced
the crime and immediately suspended the writ of habeas corpus. He ordered high profile
arrests, such as those of nationalist group leaders like Dr. Nemesio Prudente, the
president of the Philippine College of Commerce, and four members of Kabataang
Makabayan (Nationalist Youth), as well as 100 subsequent arrests of people allegedly
involved in a Communist terrorist bomb plot.217
Senator Jose Diokno, a leading Nacionalista Party member, promptly resigned
following the Plaza Miranda bombing. He claimed that, “military men trained by the
military threw grenades, not Communists as charged by Marcos” and that “fragments of
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grenades found at the plaza indicate that it came from army armory.”218 This was not a
surprising accusation. At first many believed that it had in fact been President Marcos‟s
hand behind the plot, but no concrete claims were ever substantiated against him. As
Stephen CuUnjieng explains, “it seems the Communists really were the likely culprits,
but the blame placed upon Marcos demonstrates his unpopularity in 1971, a fact which
many forget by 1972 when martial law was declared and welcomed.”219
Marcos‟s actions did warrant suspicion, however. He very quickly seized the
bombing as an opportunity to turn the situation on Senator Ninoy Aquino. Ferdinand
Marcos accused Aquino of aiding the Communist threat by supplying weapons and
ammunition. President Marcos also claimed that Aquino himself was a Communist.
Selflessly, Marcos vowed that he would do all he could to block Aquino from ascending
to the presidency, even if it meant offering Mrs. Marcos as a candidate.
Various events, however, which combined to paint the scene of lawless violence
and radical uprising that President Marcos desired, were in fact staged. As early as the
end of his first term, Marcos provoked political violence to secure his re-election.220
Congressman Locsin reveals,
Mrs. Marcos had a list of Leftist leaders on her payroll … she actually had
them on a payroll and they would take part in demonstrations and Marcos
would say the Communists were about to take over. I must say though,
that was later … [T]hey got a grip on the Leftist demonstrations [which
were genuine] and turned it around and used it for their purposes again.
That‟s true, because I was a witness to that, [Mrs. Marcos] had many of
them on the payroll.221
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Much like Marcos took the advantage in painting the Communists as being on the side of
disorder, and his “democratic revolution” on the side of radical reform in addition to
order, he fomented the explosive climate to his own ends. When Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile was attacked on September 22nd, 1972, Marcos boldly called it the “last straw,”
leading him declare martial law. In keeping with Congressman Locsin‟s claims, Enrile
would later admit that the ambush had, in fact, been staged.

LANSANG V. GARCIA
Lansang v. Garcia tried the validity of President Marcos‟s suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. The case was the nail in the coffin for democracy under Marcos.
Certainly, due to President Marcos‟s legal background, he was very careful to proceed
only with full legal support. Later, when he declared martial law, critics maintained that
the Supreme Court and lower courts were open and that Congress and the Constitutional
Convention were both in session.222 The Lansang v. Garcia case, however, which took
place nine months prior to President Marcos‟s declaration of martial law, had already
decided the constitutionality of the declaration.223
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld President Marcos‟s
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, stating “We entertain … no doubt about the
existence of a group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the
government and have been and are still engaged in rebellion against the government of
the Philippines.”224 The Lansang v Garcia case thus “abandoned the doctrine of noninquiry into the factual basis for the President‟s suspension of the privilege of the writ of
222
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habeas corpus, a doctrine which the Court used in previous cases and which was justified
on the basis of separation of powers.”225 This would seem to set a precedent for increased
judicial activism, however, in practice, deciding upon political questions only placed the
judiciary in the role of legitimizing Marcos‟s regime, for they were consistently unable to
stand up to the executive branch.
Not only failing to challenge the President‟s judgment, now the Supreme Court
also rubber stamped Marcos‟s actions. The decision had profound implications as it
removed any obstacle to the President‟s declaration of martial law. With regards to the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Stephen CuUnjieng notes,
Marcos tested to see if people would complain and when only the
intellectuals and students did, not the masses, and the Supreme Court
upheld its validity saying that it was the power of Marcos to suspend [the
writ], guess what happens, the next year he says “the same provision that
suspends the writ of habeas corpus also allows me to declare martial
law.”226
Indeed, Marcos would repeatedly invoke the Lansang v. Garcia case in his September 23,
1972 speech, in order to assert the constitutionality of his declaration of martial law. This
fact only supports Mr. CuUnjieng‟s assertion that Marcos‟s actions were discrete pieces
of a gradual, evolving strategy to remain in power. Atty. Romulo also supports this
analysis, discussing Lansang v. Garcia and noting,
[E]veryone feels that, that opened the door to Martial Law ultimately,
because the Supreme Court believed … that the NPA [was] really a clear
and present danger to the republic, so they allowed the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, so with that, that‟s only one step away from martial
law. When you say that there‟s an imminent danger, our constitution …
[dictated that] you could then declare Martial Law … Marcos … very
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smartly, knew that he couldn‟t declare Martial Law off-hand, so he laid
the basis [first].227
Marcos only took this final step after September 22nd, 1972, when the Secretary of
Defense, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, was ambushed. Marcos‟s handwritten diary entry
from that night reads:
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile was ambushed near Wack-Wack at about 8
p.m. tonight. It was a good thing he was riding in his security car as a
protective measure. His first car, which he usually uses, was the one
riddled by bullets from a car parked in ambush. He is now at his DND
office and I have advised him to stay there. And I have doubled the
security of Imelda [Marcos] in Nayong Pilipino where she is giving dinner
to the UPI and AP as well as other wire services. This makes the martial
law proclamation a necessity.228
Marcos‟s diary should not be taken at face value, for his admitted concern over how
history would judge him is what compelled him to write it at all. Despite Marcos‟s
feigned shock and worry, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile admitted at a press conference with
Fidel Ramos in February 1986 that the ambush was staged. 229 The Philippine Inquirer
further reports that “[Enrile] and Ramos were part of the „Rolex 12,‟ the group of military
advisers who had helped Marcos plan martial law.”230
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HERE TO STAY
DECLARING MARTIAL LAW
Proclamation No. 1081 proclaimed the state of martial law. In it, Marcos listed the
NPA‟s advancements and activities as an effort to “wage a full scale armed insurrection
and rebellion in this country … vigorously pursuing a relentless and ruthless armed
struggle against our duly constituted government.”231 Note the use of the word
“insurrection,” which appears ten times throughout the document and connects the
country‟s situation to the one precisely described by the language of Article VII, Section
10, Paragraph 2 of the 1935 Constitution.232 In addition, the term “lawless violence”
appears three times in Proclamation No. 1081, while “rebellion” appears thirteen times.
This is of course natural, for it is necessary to justify one‟s basis for declaring martial law
in legal and constitutional terms.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who was the architect of martial law, verifies that
President Marcos had indeed been planning martial law for quite some time. There had
been the frequent references to the possibility that Mrs. Marcos would “have to run” in
order to save the country from Communism, Ninoy Aquino, and other “dangers.” These,
in addition to the early investigations into martial law and its relevant judicial precedents,
as well as Marcos‟s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which occurred just before
his constitutional elected term should have ended, point towards a premeditated strategy
designed to prolong his stay in power.

231

“Proclamation No. 1081, September 21, 1972: Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines.”
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation. 29 Jan. 2009. <http://www.lawphil.net/executive/proc/
proc_1081_1972.html>
232
Constitution of the Philippines Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1969, p. 22.
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09

80

When asked how early into 1971, when the Plaza Miranda bombing occurred, or
1972, the promulgation of Proclamation No. 1081, Ferdinand Marcos had first begun
thinking about martial law, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile replied, “We started studying
Martial Law December of 1969.”233 December 1969 was just one month after Marcos‟s
second term began, a full year before the ConCon of November 1970, and a year and a
half prior to his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Senator Enrile describes the
preparation for martial law, recounting:
We prepared a well-argued, well-written compendium of cases and articles
bearing on the subject. And he asked me to prepare all the documents
without any model and I did it. And I finished the preparation in the third
quarter of 1970. I gathered all the facts, the incidents about the current
rebellion at the time, the Communist Party of the Philippines, and the
condition of law and order in the country, and I put them together and
wrote out the proclamation. And the seven General Orders, seven Letters
of Instruction, including the first document, [which] was prepared not by
me, but by the Palace.234
Senator Enrile further intimates that in his preparation, he relied upon the 1905 Barcelon
v. Baker case sustaining Governor-General James F. Smith‟s suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.235 Governor-General Smith‟s suspension was the Philippines‟ first
experience with the kind of authoritative executive action that President Quirino would
later take and that Ferdinand Marcos would eventually bring to its extreme conclusion.
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JUSTIFICATION
President Marcos outlined in clear and persuasive terms the state of danger that
existed, the necessity for martial law, and the legality of his actions. Proclamation No.
1081 of September 21st, 1972 begins by describing the NPA,
[W]hose daring and wanton guerrilla activities have generated and sown
fear and panic among our people; have created a climate of chaos and
disorder, produced a state of political, social, psychological and economic
instability in our land, and have inflicted great suffering and irreparable
injury to persons and property in our society…236
Cleverly, Marcos then calls upon the people‟s allegiance to government, constitution, and
rule of law, which not only paints his actions as necessary, but also non-radical and
logical. His language divides the country into opposing sides, wherein the country has
been victimized and Marcos‟s administration lies on the side of order, law, and history.
Proclamation No. 1081 declares,
Whereas, these lawless elements, their cadres, fellow travelers, friends,
sympathizers and supporters have for many years up to the present time
been mounting sustained, massive and destructive propaganda assaults
against our duly constituted government, its instrumentalities, agencies
and officials, and also against our social, political, economic and religious
institutions, through the publications, broadcasts and disseminations of
deliberate slanted and overly exaggerated news stories and news
commentaries as well as false, vile[,] foul and scurrilous statements,
utterances, writings and pictures…237
Proclamation No. 1081 continues, describing the NPA‟s actions as:
[C]learly well-conceived, intended and calculated to malign and discredit
our duly constituted government, its instrumentalities, agencies, and
officials, before our people, making it appear to the people that our
government has become so weak and so impotent…238
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Heard by all, these pronouncements and their tone masterfully stir a desire for the
government to retaliate swiftly, decisively, and forcefully. Such action, backed by the
constant reminders of its constitutional provision and the judicial precedents of Philippine
history, is what President Marcos promised to deliver.
Proclamation No. 1081 makes explicit the legality and logic to martial law, given
the Lansang v. Garcia decision. The Proclamation outlines,
Whereas, the Supreme Court in the cases brought before it, docketed as
G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L34039, L-34265, and L-34339, as a consequence of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by me as President of the
Philippines in my Proclamation No.889, dated August 21, 1971, as
amended, has found that in truth and in fact there exists an actual
insurrection and rebellion in the country by a sizeable group of men who
have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government…239
The document then goes on to quote at length from the Supreme Court‟s Lansang v.
Garcia decision. The quotes take pains to reiterate history and the judiciary‟s recognition
of the existence of “communist activities in the Philippines … from the late twenties to
early thirties … aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion.”
The included Lansang v. Garcia excerpts continue to describe how these
insurgent activities waned, but resurfaced in the late forties “with such vigor as to be able
to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army … which clashed several times with
the armed forces.” The decision then states that those events caused “President Quirino to
issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castañeda.”240
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The Supreme Court decision also substantiates the danger that the Communist
army has historically posed, citing the June 20th, 1957 Republic Act No. 1700, also
known as the Anti-Subversion Act. The decision specifically quotes the preamble to the
Anti-Subversion Act, which states:
[T]he Communist Party of the Philippines, although a purportedly
apolitical party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to
alien domination and control … the continued existence and activities of
the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present and
grave danger to the security of the Philippines; and … in the fact of the
organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but
international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to
cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country ... 241
The Supreme Court continues to list the Communist party‟s 1963 mobilization and 1969
reorganization into the New People‟s Army, which adheres to the Maoist concept of the
“War of National Liberation.”242 Lastly, Proclamation No. 1081 then includes in full, the
NPA‟s “Regional Program of Action 1972,” a copy of which the 116th and 119th
Philippine Constabulary Companies captured on June 18th, 1972. This Program of Action
delineates alarmingly and in great detail, the NPA‟s goals and plans.
Despite the existence and gravity of a real Communist threat, however, it was
ultimately Lansang v. Garcia that opened the doors to martial law. The Supreme Court‟s
1971 decision both verified the Communist threat and sustained President Marcos‟s
invocation of Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2. For, Article VII provides for the
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suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, then in the same breath, a corollary provision for
the declaration of martial law.

A COURSE OF ACTION
Proclamation No. 1081 concludes with an evaluation of the courses of action open
to the president. The document reads that first, President Marcos could “call out the
armed forces to suppress the present lawless violence,” second, “suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus to make arrest and apprehension of these lawless elements
easier and more effective,” or third, “place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.”243 From there, President Marcos reminds the public that he had already
committed almost fifty per cent of the entire armed forces as well as created specific task
forces to combat the insurgency, in addition to suspending the writ of habeas corpus.244
“But in spite of all that,” Marcos continued, “both courses of action were found
inadequate and ineffective to contain, much less solve, the present rebellion and the
lawlessness in the country.”245 Marcos then went on to once again prove the existence
and gravity of the Communist threat. After which, Proclamation No. 1081 concluded
with the President‟s final declaration:
Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph
(2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my
capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed
forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws
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and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction. In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently
detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for
the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses
committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or
in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of
nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of
authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia,
crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be
enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as
crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order or
regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my
direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by
me or by my duly designated representative.246
In President Marcos‟s nationwide radio and television broadcast proclaiming
martial law, he began with the assurance that his aims were democratic:
The proclamation of martial law is not a military takeover. I, as your duly
elected President of the Republic, use this power implemented by the
military authorities to protect the Republic of the Philippines and our
democracy.247
Marcos then rallied for the nation‟s support in favor of his democracy over Communism,
and for cooperation in his decision to impose martial law. Marcos declared,
A republican and democratic form of government is not a helpless
government. When it is imperiled by the danger of a violent overthrow,
insurrection and rebellion, it has inherent and built-in powers wisely
provided for under the Constitution. Such a danger confronts the
Republic.248
President Marcos then enumerated the new orders and rules of conduct under
martial law. These first orders were that, first, “all public officials and employees whether
of the national or local governments must conduct themselves in the manner of a new and
reformed society.” Second, government would “control media and other means of
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dissemination of information as well as all public utilities” for the “meantime.”
Furthermore, all schools would be closed for a week, the “carrying of firearms outside
residences without permission of the armed forces” would be punishable by death, a
curfew would be in place from midnight to four in the morning, “departure of Filipinos
abroad” would be temporarily suspended,249 and lastly, rallies, demonstrations, and
“strikes in critical public utilities” would be temporarily prohibited.250 President Marcos
explained, “It is my intention beginning tomorrow to issue all the orders which would
attain reforms in our society.”251

A NEW REGIME FOR A NEW SOCIETY
President Marcos made his broadcast at 7:15 PM on September 23rd, 1972. The
few who processed Marcos‟s opening words – “As of the 21st of September, I signed
Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under martial law. This proclamation
was to be implemented upon my clearance, and clearance was granted at 9:00 in the
evening of the 22nd of September.” – would have realized that there was a delay between
the time that the declaration went into effect and when it was publicly broadcasted.252
Marcos had purposefully done so in order to time his arrests. Journalist Amando Doronila
of The Philippine Inquirer, who had been Editor-in-Chief of The Manila Chronicle in
1972 until martial law interrupted business, writes, “Arrest orders of targets, including
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opposition figures and newspapermen, were served beginning at midnight of Sept. 22,
Friday, straddling Sept. 23.”253
The last headline article for The Manila Chronicle reported Sen. Benigno Aquino,
Jr. accusing President Marcos of “preparing the ground for an administration plot to
liquidate [him],” which Marcos would then conveniently blame on the Communists.254
Doronila recounts, “Troops descended on all newspapers, padlocked them and nailed the
proclamation dated Sept. 21. Marcos trumped Aquino and shocked the country with
superb use of the element of surprise by manipulating the dates of the proclamation.”255
This manipulation was unprecedented, but unfortunately, not explicitly illegal.
On September 23rd, Ferdinand Marcos wrote in his diary at 12:20 noon:
Things have moved according to plans although out of the total 200 target
personalities in the plan only 53 have been arrested, including the three
senators, Aquino, Jose Diokno and Ramon Mitra and Chino Roces
[publisher of The Manila Times] and Teddy [Teodoro Locsin Sr.], editor
of the Philippines Free Press. Roces, Locsin, Max Soliven of The Manila
Times, Napoleon Rama of the Free Press and Luis Mauricio of the
Graphic were among the first to be arrested at midnight at their homes in
the first round of arrests…I was surprised to hear [Executive] Secretary
[Alex] Melchor say he was now in favor of martial law although he was
against it a year and a half ago. And all [Justice] Secretary Jose Abad
Santos said was, „Let us not talk about it publicly.‟256
Given the immediate arrest of his father Teodoro Locsin Sr., and the destruction of their
family newspaper, Congressman Teodoro Locsin Jr. remains deeply impacted by the
declaration of martial law. Congressman Locsin recounts the reaction of another of his
relatives, Roberto “Bobby” Benedicto, who “was [a] notorious … crook … one of the
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worst [Marcos] cronies.”257 Locsin reports that Bobby Benedicto used to tell him that
when Marcos declared martial law, “he cried … [Benedicto] was so scared … it wouldn‟t
work.”258 Congressman Locsin explains that the fear stemmed from the fact that the
Philippine tradition wasn‟t one of heavy-handed, executive directed action, such as
military rule, and that it simply wasn‟t anything the people “could conceive of.” Locsin
recalls,
[Benedicto] thought he was going to die, that the army would not obey,
that they‟d turn around and kill him instead. So the reason Benedicto
became close to the others is [that] they actually held him in his arms and
comforted him in that seventy-two hour period … It took us all by
surprise. And we believed all that rhetoric: we the people don‟t want this;
we the people don‟t want that. Well “we the people” weren‟t us
[Filipinos], we just don‟t do anything, and that was it, and that‟s all. I
mean, that … [previous] political class lasted from before Independence to
the eve of September ‟72, and it vanished overnight. It was just gone. I
don‟t know what that says. [Then] Marcos just installed his own class.259
Despite the natural surprise, as Congressman Locsin points out, there was no
widespread anger or retaliation, no demands for a restitution of citizens‟ rights. For, along
with these arrests, Marcos immediately adjourned the National Congress, shut down most
of the mass media, suspended civil liberties, and banned all political parties. 260 As
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile notes, though, “there was a reason for [martial law],” which
explains the initial lack of protest. He elaborates,
It was the height of the Vietnam War, it was … the feeling at the time was
that the wave of communist victories around the world was such that the
next target of communism was the Philippines and the New People‟s
Army was building its forces and in fact, they succeeded in importing into
the country about 1,500 M14s plus rocket-propelled grenades, the, what
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they call, RPG 40, which they used in Vietnam extensively. And we
captured this shipment in Isabela.261
Martial law far outlasted its original purpose, however, lifted only in 1981 long after the
Communists had been beaten back. In a New York Times interview on June 17th, 1974,
President Marcos admitted that he had “largely „neutralized‟ the „public disorder and
rebellion‟ that led him to impose martial law … nearly two years ago,” in 1972. 262 He
went on to explain, however, that, “he had not been able to complete the social and
economic reforms that he said were necessary to prevent recurrence of the so-called
rebellion.”263 Ferdinand Marcos himself would not be removed from power until the
People‟s Power Revolution of 1986. For that whole time, Marcos would seek to, as
Rolando V. del Carmen describes, “portray to observers at home and abroad … despite
the realities of martial law, [that] constitutional procedures have not been abrogated and
that the judiciary [was] alive and well.”264
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE MARTIAL LAW REGIME
PUBLIC REACTIONS
In 1972, the people were very scared of what was quite a serious Philippine
Communist threat. Stephen CuUnjieng explains the nation‟s Cold War mentality, being a
strong American ally and located very close to Vietnam. He explains,
First, this is a very Catholic country, and [Communism] was the Godless
heathen ... Two, at that time it was a real battle between the two systems.
Socialism and Communism hadn‟t been intellectually discredited yet and
people didn‟t realize the excesses of the Cultural Revolution … You were
either a romantic believer in Communism or socialism, or you were just
God-fearing, you know, scared of the heathen government state … Marcos
played on that fear very well.265
In fact, neither was the Philippines nor Ferdinand Marcos alone in this situation and the
trend within the larger Southeast Asian region was indeed moving towards more
authoritarian and controlled states.
Echoing this sentiment, Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata was attending the
World Bank Meeting in Washington, DC when martial law was declared. He recounts
that a senior reporter from the Department of State called him at about four in the
afternoon and asked him if he was aware of the recent events.266 Mr. Virata had no
foreknowledge of the declaration and when the reporter asked him how he felt, Virata
replied, “We just joined the Asian people.”267 Virata clarifies, explaining, “Everything
here [at the time] was Martial Law: Korea, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand,

265

CuUnjieng, Stephen. Personal Interview. 15 Aug. 2008.
Virata, Cesar. Personal Interview. 20 Aug. 2008.
267
Ibid.
266

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09

91

Singapore. Malaysia had their internal security act. So I said, „Well, we are now part of
Asia as well.‟”268
Therefore, despite Congressman Locsin‟s belief that it was not in the Philippine
historical tradition to take so extreme an action, there was not only a history of strong
executive action in the Philippines, but also within the larger context of Southeast Asia.
This may have played into the Philippine people‟s justification of their situation. The
Cold War context is precisely what gave Marcos the ability to so drastically extend the
limits of the historical political tradition. Virata discusses the unique position that Marcos
was in, explaining,
[I]n 1966 … [the] war in Vietnam was raging. [Marcos] went on a State
Visit to the U.S. and during the talks … they decided to call a SITO
meeting here in the Philippines in 1966 [and] President Johnson came. He
wanted … the Philippines to send fighting troops to Vietnam and Marcos
resisted ... He did not [want] to send fighting troops, unlike [during] the
situation in Korea in the early 50s, because during that time … we [were]
under threat from the … Maoist group here, idolizing Chairman Mao with
[his] revolutionary approach … [T]hen on the other hand, you have the
Russians working largely through the East Europeans, getting in touch
with our Leftist labor unions, and they [gave] rewards for striking, helping
them, and so on ... So the pressures [were] really great and from a
positional viewpoint … the Philippines … [was] unlike Japan, or Korea …
[had] American bases [so] … we [were] not considered neutral.269
Stephen CuUnjieng further reflects on the economic and social circumstances that
fed into the public acquiescence, explaining,
[W]hen martial law was declared … there was a lot of unrest in the streets;
it was the Vietnam era, with student protests and walk-outs. People felt
that the hippies and radicals were chaos, to which, most people said “Que
horror, this chaos.” So people said lets have some order. Pre-martial law
society was getting frayed, the rich were getting richer and the poor were
getting poorer. It was not a healthy society that [Marcos] declared martial
law into. The limits of the 1935 constitutional system of government were
268
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staring to show. We were starting to fall behind economically, then there
was also the oil shock … Part of the economic problem was that Marcos
was overspending and using government funds for his reelection. But,
there was also legitimate economic hardship and social chaos, which
played into that. Therefore, the more traditional, conservative side said we
need order and, frankly, martial law was legitimately popular in the early
days. 270
Among those of the more traditional, conservative side at the time, Supreme Court
Justice under President Corazon Aquino, Florentino P. Feliciano, reflects on the reaction
to and popularity of martial law,
[Martial law was] popular among certain segments, because they were frightened.
I suppose they were giving Mr. Marcos the benefit of the doubt. And of course the
street demonstrations stopped so the middle income sector [was] happy about that,
but for the lower income bracket it [didn‟t] make much difference.271
With regards to his personal reaction, Justice Feliciano recounts,
I remember my normal stance was, “this is something way beyond my
power; there is nothing I can do.” So I took the stance of a detached
observer, but within a few years…either the original purpose, the
concealed original purpose, began to emerge, or – just to give him the
benefit of doubt – the figure of … our infirm humanity manifested itself.
When you have a population under tight control, you can do anything you
want, which means, you can steal anything you want, you can force other
people to give you their property … Or you throw your opponents in jail
… All the frailties, weaknesses, human weaknesses, manifest themselves.
It was a highly authoritarian government. The problem with an
authoritarian government [is that], while it produces calm and order,
almost everything depends on who the Martial Law administrator is, who
the dictator is, and who the people around him are, because he cannot
maintain himself, by himself, in power. He needs to create allies around
him, and to create allies you have to give them bones.272
Justice Feliciano‟s “detached observer” role became the nation‟s general code of conduct
during the martial law years. Though regrettable and against the recent trend of
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demonstrations in the 1970s, this is not surprising given the Philippines‟ long history of
apathy to and acceptance of the politicians myriad misgivings.
President Ramos explains, “In the beginning, those of us in the armed forces
really supported the idea, but it lasted too long and became subject to abuse of power.”273
President Ramos frames his support for martial law in terms that extend beyond merely
communism, which explains his early cooptation into Marcos‟s “Rolex 12” group:
[To] those of us in the armed forces and law enforcement, it was
something that we could support because we felt that it would … return …
the rule of law. We would be able to go after the private armies of the
warlords in the provinces. [Over the first three years] we collected so
many loose firearms and jailed a lot of abusive politicians who were
breaking the law.274
So it seems that from the beginning, Marcos – and to a degree, the “Rolex 12” – had
intended for martial law to address a variety of issues, though they argued for it legally
and to the public solely in terms of the Communist threat.
This is what led the lawyers and intellectuals to realize in hindsight, that the
Constitution Marcos would later enforce, specifically its Transitory Provisions, were, as
Stephen CuUnjieng says, “just a sham”:
Everything [was] just being doctored and contorted to fit what one man
wants. It‟s a prostitution of the legal process where the letter of the law is
followed but completely prostituting the spirit, which is to be frank very
Marcos. You can‟t say anything didn‟t follow the rules, but it was sort of a
perversion of the application of the rules, beyond any comprehension, then
he changes how the rules apply so the next time he does something it‟s
still valid.275
This prostitution only fully applies to the sham Constitution, which ultimately
allowed Marcos to establish personalistic rule. The public‟s tolerance and, above all, the
273
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Supreme Court‟s silence, however, justified and legitimized Marcos‟s actions. In this
way, the citizens and, more importantly, the judiciary were the culprits for allowing
Marcos to bend the political tradition for his means. For this was not immediately a
dictatorship. The contours of Ferdinand Marcos‟s authoritarianism developed only
gradually and with the protection of full, though perverted, legal backing throughout. As
Stephen CuUnjieng reports,
That‟s why Ninoy [Aquino] was so disappointed. He said I expected there
to be marching in the streets, but instead everyone stayed home. He said,
“I was correct about Marcos, I was wrong about the Filipino people.”276

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM
Marcos described his regime as “constitutional authoritarianism.” He never
openly attacked the impartiality or independence of the Supreme Court and instead relied
on his constitutionally vested powers to appoint judges of his choice. Having banned all
political parties and Congress, Marcos openly declared his actions to be subject to the
judicial review of the Supreme Court. He assured that “the judiciary shall continue to
function in accordance with its present organization and personnel.”277 Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza is quick to point out that the martial law regime readily received the
suits that were brought against the government. He believes that though “somewhat
paradoxical” given the state of crisis, this fact evidences that Marcos left the judiciary
healthy, unimpaired, and fully functioning. Mendoza notes,
In the ordinary concept of martial law, the government is superior and not
subject to constraints resulting [in] judicial review. But, [this was] one of
the primary, and I think important, decisions of President Marcos, which is
276
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not fully appreciated … [He was in] a difficult position … the options
were to disregard the complaints from the Supreme Court … to tell the
Supreme Court that he declared a revolutionary government and thus was
not subject to decisions of the courts – but that would mean suspension of
the Constitution, and suspension of civil rights … [or] to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court … President Marcos decided on the
second option … to take the position that martial law was proclaimed by
the president under the Constitution and under conditions prescribed by
the Constitution.278
Solicitor General Mendoza is right to point out that Marcos submitted his
government to the Supreme Court‟s jurisdiction, but he ignores the reasons why Marcos
did so. It was not to preserve the constitutional process, which Marcos repeatedly
prostituted, or to defend civil rights, which he ignored when it benefited him. Marcos saw
the utility in leaving the courts intact and “independent.” Due to his legal background;
however, he also instinctively, and sincerely, hesitated to attack the courts. Indeed, at no
point did Marcos wish to declare to the world that he was establishing a dictatorship and
that his rule would be absolute. Marcos took pains to cloak his actions with a semblance
of legality instead, seeking to present to the international community and Filipino people
that he was not departing from the past political tradition. For this reason, he made sure
only to proceed with full, albeit perverted, legal backing.
Hon. Lazaro provides a clear example of this, recounting,
[Marcos is] one fellow who would not commit anything illegal. If you tell
him that it‟s … illegal he will not do it, but he will find some way to make
it legal. For instance, there is a law … which says that all government
properties must be insured by the GSIS … Roberto Benedicto, he wanted
to [to be the one to] insure … some [government] properties … When
[Marcos] was informed that, Benedicto, [despite the fact] that he was a
political supporter [of Marcos], [could] not do it, because it was against
the law. He had to pass the law to allow it, [which stated]: all government
properties [will] be insured by the GSIS, except in cases as approved by

278

Mendoza, Atty. Estelito. Personal Interview. 13 Aug. 2008.

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09

96

the President … [So] if he approves it, it‟s legal … [and] no [longer]
illegal. That‟s how legalistic [Marcos] was.279
In his analysis, Lazaro doesn‟t focus on Marcos‟s prostitution of the law to fit his needs.
Rather, he applauds Marcos for his insistence upon obtaining legal support to his actions.
Unfortunately, this entirely ignores the fact that Marcos had to first break the law in order
to gain such legal backing.
In a larger context, however, if Marcos could achieve his desired goals alongside
an “independent” judiciary all the better. For a functioning, unimpaired court could only
serve to protect his powers from charges of foul play by the opposition. An independent
judiciary was thus, his most useful defense. To these points, Atty. Ricardo J. Romulo
comments,
During martial law [the courts] were totally supine, anything Marcos
ordered with regards to martial law was „amen‟. But I would like to say
that with regards to plain civil cases, by which I mean corporate work and
that sort of thing, where Marcos did not intervene, [the courts] were quite
unbiased and competent.280
With regards to martial law, it would only be later, as a consequence of the March 31st,
1973 Javellana v. The Executive Secretary case that the judiciary became locked in a
state of inertia, effectively powerless for the rest of the martial law regime. Had they
decided to rule differently, perhaps the Supreme Court could have played a different rule
under martial law, for at this early stage, Marcos had indeed given them one rare
opportunity to do so.
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THE 1973 CONSTITUTION
With the declaration of martial law, Marcos ordered the arrests of the anti-Marcos
Constitutional Convention delegates. After such an attack, the rest bowed to Marcos in
fear. The ConCon, nevertheless, preserved their decision to switch to a parliamentary
system and the constitution‟s new tone of social consciousness. Marcos mandated the
creation and inclusion of the Transitory Provisions, however, which allowed him to
remain President and de facto dictator, ruling without a legislature. Marcos never truly
implemented the new constitution, never elected a new prime minister, and in the end the
Transitory Provisions ruled the country.
The 1973 Constitution changed the governmental system from a presidential US
structure to a parliamentary one. Therefore, the position of the president became merely a
symbolic post, with the powers to:
1) “Address the National Assembly at the opening of its regular session”;
2) “proclaim the election of the Prime Minister”; 3) “dissolve the National
Assembly and call for a general election as provided (for)”; 4) “accept the
resignation of the Cabinet as provided (for)”; 5) “attest to the appointment
or cessation from office of members of the Cabinet, and of other officers
as may be provided by law”; 6) “appoint all officers and employees in his
office in accordance with the Civil Service Law”; and 7) “perform such
other duties and functions of state as may be provided by law.”281
The New Society‟s unicameral National Assembly was, thus, the center of power. Article
VIII, Section 3, sub-section 1 set the term limit of its members at six years and Section 4
restricted the office to natural-born Filipinos.282 According to Article VIII, the National
Assembly held the power to depose the Prime Minister with a majority vote for a
successor (Section 13, sub-section 1) and ratify treaties (Section 14, sub-section 1). The
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National Assembly also held the “sole power to declare the existence of a state of war”
(Section 14, sub-section 2).283
When he seized emergency powers, Marcos only allowed the judiciary to
continue to operate independently. With respect to the judiciary‟s functioning and its role
within the separation of powers, the new constitution instituted no serious changes from
the 1935 Constitution.284 The Supreme Court could act as a single body, en banc, or in
two divisions, and the types of cases it could hear, as well as its procedure for appeals,
remained the same.285 There were some changes from the 1935 Constitution. Article X,
Section 2, sub-section 1 enlarged the Supreme Court from eleven to fourteen associate
justices and one chief justice.286 Insignificantly, Justices were also now required to be
natural-born citizens, but otherwise the qualifications remained the same. Lastly, the
Constitution created the Sandiganbayan, a constitutional court specifically designed to
try public officials for charges of graft and corruption, which was an unprecedented,
though ultimately ineffective, innovation in Philippine judicial history287

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
The most offensive portion of the 1973 Constitution was Article XVII, the
Transitory Provisions. The Transitory Provisions were supposed to ensure a smooth
transition from the 1935 Constitution to the new charter, but this proved to be hollow.
First, Article XVII, Section 2 provides for an interim National Assembly, mandating:
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The members of the interim National Assembly shall be the incumbent
President and Vice-President of the Philippines, those who served as
President of the nineteen hundred and seventy-one Constitutional
convention, those Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall express in writing to the Commission on
Election…their option to serve therein, and those Delegates…who have
opted to serve therein by voting affirmatively for this Article...288
Only 15 out of 317 delegates voted against Article XVII, prominent among them were
Rev. Pacifico A. Ortiz, S.J., Enrique Voltaire R. Garcia II, Jose Mari Velez, Raul S.
Manglapus, and Heherson T. Alvarez.289 In addition to applying heavy political pressure,
Marcos offered potential interim National Assembly members 216,000 pesos annually for
salary and expenses, and as Rolando V. del Carmen notes, “the attractiveness of this selfinduced offer must have been irresistible to all but the most patriotic of delegates!”290
The ultimate purpose of the provisions was to enable Ferdinand Marcos to replace
any government official at will and to validate all his martial law decrees.291 Section 3,
sub-section 2 declares:
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the
land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after the
lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless
modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National
Assembly.292
Furthermore, sub-section 2 of Article XVII stated that the incumbent President:
[S]hall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and Prime Minister …
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until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the Interim
President and Prime Minister.293
No definite date for this election was set, for it would take an indefinite period of time to
create his New Society, and the Philippines endured thirteen and a half years under
Ferdinand Marcos. The Constitutional Convention unilaterally ratified this new
Constitution on November 30th, 1972.294 Marcos then issued a decree allowing for free
debate of the Charter provisions and scheduling a plebiscite to vote by secret ballot on
January 15th, 1973.295 This concession never materialized. As scholar Benjamin Muego
observes,
Through a complicated set of Supreme Court decisions, edicts, referenda,
and clever and astute political maneuvers, Marcos was able to discharge
the powers of the president under the 1935 Constitution and those of prime
minister under the 1973 Constitution. In short, he was the legislative and
executive, all rolled into one.296
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CHAPTER NINE: LEGITIMIZATION
A NEW JUDICIARY
Though the Constitution protected the Supreme Court, the lower courts were
subject to various encroachments. With the Transitory Provisions allowing President
Marcos to act as both the executive and legislature, he could have abolished the lower
courts or modified them to his liking.297 In fact, the September 22nd, 1972 General Order
No. 3 did just that, effectively granting immunity to those carrying out Marcos‟s orders
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081.298 The order removed from the civil courts‟
jurisdiction:
1) Those [cases] involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of any
decree, order or acts issued, promulgated or performed by [him] or by
[his] duly designated representatives pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,
dated September 21, 1972.
2) Those involving crimes against national security and the Law of
Nations.
3) Those involving crimes against the fundamental laws of the State.
4) Those involving crimes against public order.
5) Those crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title, and
improper use of names, uniforms, and insignia.
6) Those involving crimes committed by public officers.299
These cases were, instead, redirected to military tribunals, where President Marcos‟s
authority was most protected. This situation comes often as a consequence of escalating
war or crises of national defense. The Cold War gave the means for a president, working
from a history of bossist, personal rule, to establish such a regime. Yet, the military
tribunals acting according to Marcos‟s desires was also, functionally, just a more radical
version of the judiciary consistently turning a blind eye to abuses.
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With regards to lower court judges, the 1973 Constitution removed all legislative
checks on the executive‟s appointing privileges and vested this power exclusively in the
prime minister.300 The Supreme Court, however, assumed a disciplinary power over
lower court judges that had previously been the authority of the executive. The 1973
Constitution lowered the mandatory retirement age to 65, down from 70 as the 1935
Constitution prescribed. This alteration gave Marcos the legal means to replace some of
the older Supreme Court justices and appoint loyalists in their place. Even tenure in the
Supreme Court seemed uncertain, however, for Section 10 of the Transitory Provisions
stated that incumbent justices could remain in office “unless sooner replaced.”
In addition to General Order No. 3, the 1973 Constitution did, very subtly, also
manage to alter the Supreme Court‟s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court enjoyed original
jurisdiction over “cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,”
and the appellate power to “review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari” lower court decisions in five areas.301 The Supreme Court possessed the power
of judicial review and the authority to declare unconstitutional any treaty, law, ordinance,
executive agreement, or executive order. With regards to its appellate jurisdiction,
however, whereas the 1935 Constitution designated “all cases in which an error or
question of law is involved,” the 1973 Constitution restricted this to “cases in which only
an error or question of law is involved. [Emphasis mine.]”302
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The Supreme Court‟s power to declare an “executive agreement” unconstitutional
now required ten concurring votes, an alteration that raised considerable, albeit quiet,
concern among law students and legal scholars at the time.303 Lastly, Article X also
required that within thirty days of the opening of the National Assembly, the judiciary
submit an “annual report on the operations and activities of the judiciary.” 304 “This
seemed to indicate, at least on the surface,” Muego argues, “a diminution of the judiciary
into a subordinate branch in relation to the executive and legislative branches.”305
Despite operating under the a time of crisis, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
asserts that the government did not win every case brought to the Supreme Court, simply
because it was martial law. “I would like to think,” he says, “[that] we won the cases on
the merits.” He offers the explanation that Marcos appointed exceptionally qualified
justices, specifically noting the role that their background played in empowering the
executive branch. Mendoza elaborates,
One significant aspect which should be noted, and maybe this helped, is
that [Marcos] appointed to the Supreme Court, several who were, at one
time, solicitor generals … There are many cases [brought to] the Supreme
Court, which do not involve direct application of the law, but in which
political considerations [come into play] … A solicitor general, because he
has been [a] lawyer for the government…as Justice, [will] go to the
Supreme Court with a familiarity and … understanding of the interests of
the government. So with that in mind, I would not say there is a likelihood
that he [will] decide in favor the government, but one can be certain [that]
when he makes his decision he‟s not going to ignore what the interests of
government are.306
Over the course of martial law, several times the Supreme Court abstained from deciding
a case, stating that it was a political question and beyond their scope. Perhaps that is what
303
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Mendoza means when he mentions the “interests of the government” with regards to such
questions. However, appointing politically and government minded, former Solicitor
Generals as Justices, politicizes the judiciary, which is precisely what the Supreme
Court‟s design aims to prevent.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Ferdinand Marcos paid great deference to the Supreme Court and when he would
defend his actions, reminded the public that he subjected his administration to the
Supreme Court‟s review all throughout. He truly submitted himself to judicial review
during Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, however, the Supreme Court, as it
historically did, sided with the executive. After this, having outmaneuvered the judiciary
and legally cornered them, Marcos could easily boast that he submitted himself to the
judiciary, because he knew the Supreme Court wouldn‟t defy him.
President Marcos‟s martial law decrees included clauses that exempted the crisis
regime‟s actions from the judiciary‟s jurisdiction.307 He gave military jurisdiction to
almost all criminal cases and exempted crimes by public officials and crimes against
public order from the Supreme Court‟s jurisdiction.308 The Supreme Court was not
accustomed to such a lack of independence, and thus, initially didn‟t hesitate to hear
cases against the validity of President Marcos‟s martial law decrees.309
When Marcos drew up the new 1973 Constitution and called a plebiscite to have
it ratified, the Supreme Court accepted petitions challenging Marcos‟s calling of a
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plebiscite. On January 21st, 1973, The New York Times cited that many were charging
Marcos with “inflating the dangers stemming from the relatively small number of
Communist-led insurgents as a means of making himself into a dictator,” and that the tide
was turning against Marcos and his new constitution.310
Headed by Lorenzo Tañada, a Harvard Law School graduate, a noted
civil-rights attorney and, until recently, a luminary of the Philippine
Senate, the opposition groups have been seeking an injunction by the
Philippine Supreme Court to prevent Mr. Marcos from putting into effect a
new authoritarian constitution … Mr. Marcos was going to submit the new
charter to a national plebiscite. Mr. Tañada and eight other petitioners
asked the Supreme Court in mid-December to prohibit the plebiscite. They
argued that the new charter had been improperly adopted, was a
contradictory, unfit and undemocratic document, and was being put to the
people by the President in violation of the rights of Congress under the old
Constitution. In any case, they argued, a fair vote on a new constitution
was impossible under martial-law suppression of free speech.311
The New York Times also reported on January 12th, 1973, that though martial law
had at first won “grudging acceptance,” because “after years of dangerous drift toward
anarchy, many … welcomed an apparent sharp drop in crime and promise of real reform,
including the proclamation of a new land reform measure,” this initial attitude was
beginning to thin:312
[T]he most telling evidence of dissatisfaction with the present regime in
Manila can be found in President Marcos‟ own recent decisions to defer a
scheduled Jan. 15 plebiscite on his new Constitution and to suppress
public debate on the proposed charter, which would permit an indefinite
extension of martial rule.313
President Marcos decision to postpone the plebiscite rested upon his claims that
“Filipinos had slipped back into their old habits and that the enemies of the state were
310
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taking advantage of the debate to foment anxiety, confusion, discord, and subversion.”314
After banning free debate of the charter and ordering that the spread of rumors be
punishable by death, on December 31st, 1972, Marcos issued Proclamation Decree No.
86. This organized national Citizens Assemblies for an informal referendum and open
vote on the new constitution.315 With Citizens Assemblies ratifying the new constitution,
the Supreme Court had no choice but to disregard the previous petitions.

“A SHOW OF HANDS”
In flagrant violation of electoral laws and previous promises, the constitution was
ratified by “a show of hands.” On January 17th, 1973, Proclamation No. 1102
“Announcing The Ratification by the Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention,” declared the constitution ratified with a 95% vote.316
These newly created Citizens Assemblies “were created in barrios, in municipalities and
in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated
December 31, 1972.”317 These assemblies were composed of:
[A]ll persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least
six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and
who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the
barrio, district or ward secretary.318
This was quite a political innovation, which Marcos claimed to have designed to
“broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample
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opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues,” his ban
on free debate notwithstanding.319
The proclamation states that the questions, “Do you approve of the new
Constitution?” and “Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution?” were posed to the Citizens Assemblies.320 The proclamation then reads:
14,976,561 … members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted
for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against … 743,869 …
who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the
people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution … 14,298,814 … answered that there was no need for a
plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should
be considered as a vote in the plebiscite.321
Marcos‟s subsequent proclamations, Proclamation No. 1103 and No. 1104, abolished the
Transitory Provisions‟ call for an interim National Assembly and imposed the
continuation of martial law for an indefinite period of time.322
On January 22nd, 1973, the Supreme Court dismissed all ten petitions challenging
Marcos‟ ability to substitute a plebiscite to pass the 1973 Constitution. Nine out of ten
members of the Supreme Court declared the question “moot and academic,” with only
Justice Calixto Zaldivar dissenting.323 Zaldivar along with Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and Justice Querube Makalintal were the only non-Marcos Supreme Court
appointees at the time.324 Marcos proclaimed that this decision had opened the way for
the Constitution‟s full enforcement. In a public statement, he said:
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Henceforth, there should be no hesitation on the part of anyone in the
implementation of the new Constitution … The ratification is an
accomplished fact. The new Constitution is in full force and effect by the
sanction of the people.325

TOWARDS A “NEW SOCIETY”
President Marcos wasted no time before officially enlarging the scope of his
programmatic intentions. With regards to this, Justice Feliciano reflects,
A lot of people think that [Marcos] and Ponce Enrile stage-managed the
thing … but Mr. Marcos, as soon as Martial Law was declared, declared
the objectives of his proclamation of Martial Law. It was not just to put
down disorder or to prevent future upheavals, but rather to change society.
Now that‟s as broad as you can get. If that is your objective you can do
almost anything you want – and the declaration did not need any
confirmation or consent of the legislative party. It was a unilateral act on
the part of the Chief Executive and it was supposed to be a temporary
situation.326
Justice Feliciano went on to proclaim that martial law was merely “a big pretense,”
which, of course, is what pushed Ninoy Aquino and the opposition to fight against
Marcos. To the pro-Marcos camp, however, martial law was not only a time of order, but
great achievement and progress.
To this day, Presidential Legal Counsel and Lawyer for the Office of Government
Corporate Council under Marcos, Hon. Manuel L. Lazaro claims,
First and foremost [Marcos] wanted what was good for the country. You
will notice that when he declared martial law he wanted to have a new
society. If you read all his books on a new society, he wanted to change
the public, the people. Well, he succeeded in the first two years. He
declared martial law in 1972. You wouldn‟t believe it. There was
discipline for two years. You couldn‟t spit. Everybody just followed suit.
[There were] no nightclubs, all nightclubs ended at about eight [PM].
[There was] no carrying of guns and things like that. [There was] no
325
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problem [with] drugs. You know why? [During the] third year [of martial
law], a fellow named Linseng, the most famous drug dealer, [Marcos] had
him convicted and … shot publicly. [After that] there were no more drug
dealers. 327
Martial law undeniably instilled an order and discipline in Philippine society that had
been absent before, however, it is Lazaro‟s contrary interpretation of the Marcos years
and their significance that is so striking. Due to the particular political tradition of the
Philippines, Lazaro‟s unabashed admiration for President Marcos doesn‟t blind him from
the dictatorial nature of Marcos‟s regime. When Lazaro brushes aside the corrupt and
self-motivated aspects to Marcos‟s rule, it is because they also drove the politicians that
came before him. The difference to Lazaro is that Marcos was still able to achieve certain
things for the Philippines. For example, Lazaro discusses the Transitory Provisions of
Marcos‟s 1972 Constitution, reflecting,
All of a sudden from … constitutional [rule] you [had] martial law, so you
[had] to have a period of adjustment. Maybe what [was] not good [was
that the Transitory Provisions gave] the President the power to suspend
Congress and make the rules himself. But, if you had, had Congress, first
of all, [Marcos] would not been able to come up with and enact all his
programs.328
Fidel V. Ramos points out the holes beneath the New Society revolution after the
first three successful years of martial law. Recalling his previous damnation of Mrs.
Imelda Marcos‟s role in this history, Ramos details,
[After] the first 3 yrs, this third force … the „conjugal dictatorship,‟ started
to overpower everybody else. Then, [Marcos had gotten] rid of the old
monopolies and oligarchs, but he created and established new monopolies
and oligarchs. The country started to suffer and that [began] the outrage
against his administration … Even before Ninoy‟s assassination, things
were already going bad.329
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JAVELLANA V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The January 22nd, 1973 Supreme Court decision declaring the legality of the 1973
Constitution‟s ratification process a “moot and academic” question, “did not deal
squarely with the legality of the new Constitution.”330 Senators Diokno, Roxas, and
Aquino, the National Press Club President Eduardo Monteclaro and two private citizens
therefore filed four more suits, requesting that the Supreme Court void the new charter
and bar its enforcement.331 The petitioners asked the judiciary to “save the Republic from
the stark reality of a dictatorship.”332 They implored the Court to order a new plebiscite,
in accordance with the 1935 Constitution, which they declared to be still in force. In
response, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza warned the Supreme Court not to interfere
in an “essentially political question,” and maintained that the Citizens Assemblies‟
ratification was in “substantial compliance” of the 1935 Constitution.333
Mendoza recounts the various threads to his defending argument in the Javellana
v. Executive Secretary Case. He first asserts that it was a political question, citing that
under the U.S. Constitution, various cases pertaining to revolutionary governments are
exempt from judicial review.334 Then, he equates a plebiscite, referendum, and ballot vote
equally, by virtue of their shared functional purpose. Mendoza explains,
What [is] the point of voting through the ballot? It is really to determine
the expression of the will of the voter. So the question really is whether
the procedure that was adopted also demonstrated the will of the electorate
and I argued that it did so … In each barangay there was a [vote],
330
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although by show of hands. Then there was a canvass of the results, and
[once all] consolidated together … one can say that, although not strictly
in accordance with the requirements of the constitution, the approval by
the people … has been manifested accurately … To the question … [as to]
whether the plebiscite … is in accordance with the constitution, I would
order that if the purpose of the plebiscite is to determine the will of the
people … it‟s better decided by the people themselves.335
In their decision for the Javellana v. Executive Secretary case, delivered on March
31st, 1973, the Supreme Court states that, “Six Justices agree that the issue of the validity
of Proclamation 1102 (announcing the ratification of the proposed Constitution) is a
justiciable question; four Justices differ.”336 According to Article XV, Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution the only means of ratifying a new constitution is through “an election
or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly
registered voters.”337 Yet, though the Supreme Court decided that the ratification was not
in “substantial compliance of the law,”
[F]our Justices hold that the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in
by the people; two Justices hold that the people have not expressed
themselves; one Justice thinks the doctrine of „Constitution by
acquiescence‟ inapplicable; while the three other justices agree that they
lack the knowledge or competence to make a determination.338
Benjamin Muego explains that, “if the court‟s decision appeared contradictory, it was
intended to be so,” because, as Rolando V. del Carmen observes, the decision was,
Strongly reminiscent of Justice [John] Marshall‟s judicial technique
employed in Marbury v. Madison where that great Chief Justice adroitly
obtained pragmatic legal results without unduly forsaking idealistic
allies.339
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Therefore, because the Court could not obtain the six votes required to decide
whether the public had acquiesced in the constitution or to declare the new constitution
not in force, the Constitution, which was in de facto operation, continued to be in force.
Rolando V. del Carmen writes in the Asian Survey, “It is here that President Marcos‟
unilateral ratification proclamation of January 17, 1973, assumed the proportion of a farsighted anticipatory legal strategy.”340 Indeed, Atty. Romulo reminds that “[President
Marcos] was meticulous at making sure that there was always a semblance of legality to
anything he did.”341
It is notable that the Supreme Court did not issue an outright endorsement for the
constitution, for they held that the ratification process was not in substantial compliance
with the 1935 Constitution. Yet, given an opportunity to assert the rule of law and
denounce Marcos‟s actions, the Supreme Court crumbled. In consequence, Javellana v.
Executive Secretary inadvertently legitimized President Marcos‟s ruling and undermined
the Supreme Court‟s basis for challenging President Marcos in the future. 342 The
judiciary‟s indecision and inability to challenge the new constitution was the turning
point for Marcos‟s regime.
Having succeeded in putting the 1973 Constitution in force, President Marcos
gained enormous power. In his column in the Philippine Inquirer, Father Joaquin Bernas,
the leading Philippine constitutional scholar, writes,
President Ferdinand Marcos had it so good. When he needed to act in a
decisive manner, he could always invoke Amendment 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Amendment 6 gave him tremendous power. It said:
340
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„Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists
a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the
necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of
the law of the land.‟ The possibility of using this provision solely
depended on the judgment of the President.343
The ratification of the 1973 Constitution and the Javellana v. Executive Secretary case
served to be the most pivotal of the Marcos years. Not only did it grant him full powers, it
legitimized his actions before the law and undercut the opposition‟s arguments against
him.
The Supreme Court had not been coerced into rendering their decision, though
they did feel the political pressures surrounding their verdict. This, however, is no
different from the “political questions” that they had decided in the past. As they did
three times before, the Supreme Court once again bowed to the executive branch. In this
way, though more extreme than his historical predecessors, the Supreme Court extended
the political tradition to include Marcos.
Though the Supreme Court had long operated alongside blatant political
violations of the rule of law, being a passive body with powers to decide only those cases
brought before them, the Court could turn a blind eye. Now, when confronted with the
question as to what was officially acceptable, the Supreme Court did not rise to assert the
Constitutional constraints upon the executive. In keeping with its historical political
tradition, the Court decided in favor of Marcos, turning a blind eye to his abuse. In this
way, though Marcos‟s actions were more extreme, the Supreme Court redefined the
traditional limits by legitimizing his actions, to embrace him within it.
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POLITICAL PRESSURES
Father Bernas explains why the Supreme Court couldn‟t persuade a majority
against Marcos in Javellana v Executive Secretary:
[One has] to understand the situation there; my own estimate is that even
if the Supreme Court majority had rejected the position of President
Marcos, it would not have made any difference. The [judiciary] was
thinking: “It‟s better for us to be here than to be completely eliminated.”344
President Marcos‟s guarantee of the judiciary‟s independence effectively backed the
Supreme Court into a corner. Granted precarious and precious independence, the
Supreme Court felt pressure to act in Ferdinand Marcos‟s favor in order to secure their
existence. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court “independently” choosing to do so
legitimized Marcos‟s rule and established a self-imposed restriction against challenging
the crisis regime in the future.
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary limited the Supreme Court‟s scope and
depth of decision-making and rendered the judiciary powerless against the crisis
regime.345 In his early days, Marcos also enjoyed great popularity and support within the
Supreme Court and general public. When Chief Justice Concepcion retired after the
Javellana v. Executive Secretary decision, the Supreme Court lost its staunch Marcos
opponent. Afterwards, President Marcos only bolstered his support within the
judiciary.346 Thus, political scientist Neal C. Tate writes,
By the end of 1974 the Philippine judiciary was no longer in a position to
provide any serious check on the martial law regime. Until the end of the
crisis regime, the Supreme Court rendered not a single decision that posed
even a mild threat to Marcos‟ rule. To achieve this result, the President
344
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never had to use or threaten coercion on the judges nor did he have to
replace oppositionist judges.347
Atty. Romulo laments, “[President Marcos] was a first rate lawyer, a brilliant mind,
before people knew it, he established the trap and then it was too late for the Supreme
Court to challenge him.”348 Marcos‟s military support, being Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces and ruling under martial law, also naturally convinced the judiciary that
dissenting against him would be pointless.
During martial law, the judiciary was not a shield against the authoritarian
regime‟s power, but rather, an extension of Marcos‟s power and legitimacy. Marcos
clearly saw this potential, but, at least initially, also genuinely respected the Court‟s
judicial powers. President Marcos possessed a powerful legal mind and the nation
considered him something of a legend in that respect. The Philippine public thus allowed
him great flexibility with regards to constitutional matters and trusted his expertise. Such
expertise, however, is what enabled President Marcos to carefully plan his actions in
order to secure maximum long-term benefits. Rolando V. del Carmen posits,
At the same time, [his legal expertise] may have instilled in him a degree
of trepidation for what might be construed in the country and abroad as
gross violations of basic constitutional precepts.349
Though the new constitution gave him power to subdue the courts, Marcos
realized that it was not in his favor to do so. The Court remained tractable and served the
crisis regime exceedingly well, protecting President Marcos‟s seizure of power and
shielding him from criticism or opposition.350 While, ultimately, the Supreme Court‟s
347

Ibid.
Romulo, Atty. Ricardo J. Personal Interview. 20 Aug. 2007.
349
Del Carmen, Rolando V. “Constitutionalism and the Supreme Court in a Changing Philippine Polity.”
Asian Survey 13.11 (1973): p. 1050-1061.
350
Ibid.
348

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09

116

legitimization bent the Philippine political tradition‟s limits to include him. Marcos‟s rule
embodies the worst flaws and tendencies of the historical political tradition, yet it was the
Cold War context that empowered him. Alongside the Supreme Court, the Cold War also
changed the normal limits of the Philippine political tradition and legitimized Marcos‟s
actions. President Marcos was not a necessary inevitability of the historical political
tradition, but blame nevertheless falls upon the larger system as well. The historical
tradition adversely created a Marcos, who would succeed in bringing it to its most
extreme form.
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CHAPTER TEN: ANSWERING THE OPPOSITION
MARTIAL LAW DECISIONS
Ferdinand Marcos promoted Makalintal to Supreme Court Chief Justice. He was
one of the two justices who, despite its ratification process, voted in favor of Marcos‟s
Constitution to ensure “successful implementation of his social and economic
reforms.”351 In addition to Makalintal, Marcos also appointed former Senator Estanislao
Fernandez, University of the Philippines law professor Ramon Aquino, and Court of
Appeals Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma, thereby making all but one justice352 of the
Supreme Court Marcos supporters.353 This imbalance heavily affected the Supreme Court
decisions to come.
Thirty-one political prisoners, including Senators Ninoy Aquino and Jose Diokno,
had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which remained pending until 1974 when the
Supreme Court finally heard the case.354 By 1974, the Supreme Court was firmly in
Marcos‟s pocket, therefore, he could confidently allow the Supreme Court to rule on the
petition. Marcos declared, “By mere fact of submission to the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court we have allowed the elimination of the power to summarily arrest any person.”355
Yet, still, The New York Times reports: “Mr. Marcos refused to say if he would free Mr.
Diokno if the Supreme Court granted him the writ.”356
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The petition charged that when Marcos had declared martial law, no state of
rebellion or insurrection existed, to which Chief Justice Makalintal responded: “such a
claim ignores the sophisticated modern setting [which] includes subversion of the most
subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual
fighting.”357 The Court decided on September 17th, 1974 to uphold “the government‟s
right to rule under martial law, detain persons without charges and restrict freedoms once
released from jail.”358 On the last point, Chief Justice Makalintal explains,
The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the
situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law necessarily
implies the power to impose upon released detainees conditions and
restriction which are germane and necessary to carry out the purposes of
the proclamation.359
All the Marcos-appointed Justices, except the former civil libertarian, Justice Fernando,
concurred. Though he supported the rest of the decision as a whole, Fernando still filed a
“qualified dissenting opinion” against the provision.360 Additionally, The New York Times
reports,
While recognizing the constitutional basis of the President‟s proclamation
[of martial law] and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, several
justices asserted in separate opinions that the court had the power to
scrutinize acts of the martial-law [g]overnment to determine whether they
had resulted in manifest transgressions of liberty.361
Five out of the eleven justices declared the legality of martial law to be beyond
their scope, but Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma “reviewed published accounts of
disturbances in the three-year period before President Marcos assumed emergency
357
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powers and agreed that a state of rebellion had existed.”362 The six justices then
concluded that President Marcos had exercised his constitutional prerogative
appropriately, given the situation, and without arbitrariness.363 This decision allowed
Marcos to announce to the world in a press-conference three days later, on the two-year
anniversary of martial law, that,
The power of the President is not absolute. For one thing, before I
proclaimed martial law I sought to establish what would have been a
coalition government. I asked the opposition parties to join me in the fight
against rebellion, but my offer was rejected peremptorily. I submitted
myself to the Supreme Court, not only once but several times. I would like
to know if any dictator would do that.364
For their part, Supreme Court Justices Antonio and Fernandez traveled to
Filipino-American communities in the United States and gave speeches in defense of
martial law. In a letter to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International
Organizations of the United States House of Representatives, Justice Fernandez assured
Donald Fraser that,
There [had] been no violation of human rights by the government because
our Supreme Court [had] already declared that the proclamation and
continuance of martial law [was] in accordance with out Constitution and
that, therefore, those arrested and detained by virtue thereof, [were] legally
under detention and cannot be said to have been deprived illegally of their
constitutional rights.365
In Honolulu, Justice Antonio argued that under Marcos, “institutions like the judiciary
can … function as they ought to in view of the „elimination‟ of politics from the
system.”366 Whereas, in the past, Antonio pointed out, “the power and interference of
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politicians impeded the swift and smooth flow of justice.”367 In truth, Marcos, like
politicians before him, was still impeding the flow of justice, just more skillfully.

DOWN, NOT OUT
Between 1974 and 1977, the Supreme Court remained effectively subdued. With
regards to Senator Ninoy Aquino‟s fate in prison, however, like the Filipino people, the
Supreme Court would not submit to Ferdinand Marcos‟s will. Ninoy had become their
hero – their only reassurance that Marcos could not rule indefinitely. When after a fouryear trial, the military tribunal court condemned Aquino to death on the charges of
murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms, the Supreme Court reacted
instinctively, albeit tentatively.
Aquino‟s conviction sparked an international outcry, moving Ferdinand Marcos to
“reopen” the case and allow Ninoy to present further evidence. 368 The seven deciding
army officers only confirmed Senator Aquino‟s prior conviction. It was at this juncture,
on December 15th, 1977, that the Supreme Court requested a delay of any further action
while they decided Aquino‟s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.369 Fox Butterfield in
the New York Times, reports that the usually intractable Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza, “immediately agreed to the Supreme Court‟s request, which seemed carefully
phrased to avoid an open challenge to Mr. Marcos.”370
According to Butterfield, when answering questions on December 15th,
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Several of the justices seemed sympathetic to Mrs. [Aquino] and sharply
critical of the military tribunal‟s conduct of the trial. It was a reflection of
the curious nature of martial law in the Philippines to see one of the
Government‟s chief law officials publicly and sharply questioned on the
conviction of an opposition figure. Ironically, Justice Antonio Barredo,
who in the past has appeared at rallies for Mr. Marcos and had spoken on
the President‟s behalf, was one of the most critical of the Government‟s
actions. “I for one feel personally offended that the military commission
did not wait for us to rule,” he said, referring to the petition of Mr.
[Aquino‟s] mother.371
This was a moment of great significance, being the first time in five years that the
Supreme Court overturned an action of Ferdinand Marcos‟s. The Supreme Court never
decided Mrs. Aquino‟s case. They continued to delay their ruling to keep Ninoy alive
without having to overtly defy Marcos.
Later, on May 10th, 1982, Ferdinand Marcos accepted the resignation of all
fourteen Supreme Court Justices, following allegations that Justice Vicente Ericta‟s son‟s
bar examination results had been changed the month before.372 Marcos did so to restore
“the prestige, integrity, and good name” of the high court and “in order to create a new
court, without the burden of the tarnished prestige of the present Supreme Court.”373 Four
days later, President Marcos swore in 15 new members to the Supreme Court, reseating
among them Chief Justice Enrique Fernando. Fernando admitted to “blurred judgment”
and expressed gratitude for Marcos‟s move to instill “new confidence” in the Supreme
Court, promising: “We will try to live up to it.”374 This scandal only draws into further
clarity, the true nature of the Philippine political tradition, from which the Supreme Court
itself isn‟t exempt.
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Corruption existed even in the Philippines‟ highest court, bankrupting the notion
that it served to uphold the rule of law. Not only did the judiciary fail to denounce
Marcos‟s abuses, but also believed that it too could operate above the rule of law. This
may complicate the Supreme Court‟s capacity to decide whether a party has acted in
accordance to the rule of law at all. What does the Supreme Court‟s legitimation of
Marcos‟s actions mean, in light of its own corruption? It was not only Marcos, but also
the historical political tradition and system that he operated in, that were unhealthy.
The Court‟s legitimation was never proof that Marcos obeyed the rule of law, but,
rather, further evidence that the political system operates above of the rule of law. The
Supreme Court‟s approval only continued to protect the tradition from the burden of
abiding by the law. Marcos did not break the system, but because of the Cold War, could
bend it to include him. This achievement casts him, not as the aberration, but the
apotheosis of the political tradition.

THE NINOY STORY
In February 1978 Senator Aquino still remained in jail. When Marcos consented
in 1978 to hold an Interim Assembly election, as the 1973 Constitution had promised,
Ninoy pledged to run, even in handcuffs. This would be the first election in five years of
martial law. Imelda Marcos agreed to head a government coalition ticket against him.375
This consent to an election was supposed to be a relaxation of martial law. If so, it proved
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shallow when the government denied Aquino‟s petition for temporary release in order to
campaign, on the grounds that it would endanger national security.376
The government later allowed Ninoy Aquino to appear on television on March
10th, 1978 to answer the campaign charges that he had worked for the CIA Stephen
CuUnjieng recalls that on that day, there was nobody to be found on the streets, because
all were watching Ninoy. President Marcos permitted Senator Aquino to run, but not
outside his prison cell. His television appearance was his first in six years. The elections
resulted in a decisive victory for Marcos‟s government coalition party and the opposition
cried charges of fraud and ballot stuffing.377 In Metro Manila, the opposition‟s hub,
somehow all twenty-one members of Marcos‟s government ticket managed to win, which
indicated foul play. Marcos reacted to the charges against him by threatening
demonstrators and ordering more arrests.
Finally, after seven and a half years of detention, in 1980, Ferdinand Marcos
allowed Senator Aquino to leave jail and fly to the U.S. to receive a necessary coronary
bypass. This permanently set aside the Supreme Court‟s pending decision for the writ of
habeas corpus. In an address before the American Newspaper Publishers Association in
Honolulu the month before, Ferdinand Marcos sought to prove that “authoritarianism
need not be synonymous with tyranny.” He hoped that his concession to Aquino would
be a demonstration of this.378
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On January 17th, 1981, after Aquino had left the country, Marcos officially lifted
martial law. That same day, Marcos also released 341 prisoners, 159 of whom had
violated national security and 182 of whom were common criminals. Henry Kamm in the
New York Times writes that Pope John Paul II‟s upcoming visit and Ronald Reagan‟s
election also explain the timing of Marcos‟s decision in 1981.379 “Mr. Marcos and his
wife have consistently been reported as chafing under the Carter administration‟s
emphasis on human rights,” Kamm reports, but, “Mr. Marcos was … encouraged … by a
reported assurance from Mr. Reagan that he would treat the Philippines „as a major
ally.‟”380 Therefore, Kamm continues, this decision is, “a gesture to invite Mr. Reagan to
initiate a warmer relationship with a country that, despite its strong independence,
continues to place great value on its ties to its former colonial ruler.”381
More than an invitation, however, Marcos had clear expectations when Reagan
assumed office. The two had formed a friendship much earlier, during the beginning of
martial law, when Reagan was still a first-term California governor. When Imelda
Marcos was planning to unveil her pet project, The Philippine Cultural Center, she
invited many heads of states, wishing to draw lavish attention to the Philippines and the
achievements of martial law. President Nixon and all her other American invites rejected
Mrs. Marcos‟s offer, so she turned to Governor Reagan. It was a flattering invitation for
Reagan and, as was Mrs. Marcos‟s style, Mr. and Mrs. Marcos showed Nancy and
Ronald a splendid time. This began the friendship that would determine much of
Philippine-American relations over the dying days of the Marcos years. Aquino never
379
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saw that ending. After a successful coronary bypass and spending some time in exile in
the U.S., when he finally returned to the Philippines, on August 21st, 1983, Ninoy was
assassinated upon sight.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: ABOVE THE RULE OF LAW
THE END
Describing his immediate reaction upon hearing this news, Stephen CuUnjieng
relates,
Nobody felt safe after Ninoy died. Whether Imelda or someone higher up
had him killed, we still don‟t know, but that day, real fear of Marcos‟s
regime set in.382
Steve Psinakis, a Greek businessman who had married into the Lopez family, was an
unwavering Marcos critic and a close friend to Ninoy Aquino. On Ninoy‟s 25th death
anniversary, Psinakis released previously classified documents for the first time,
including a transcript of his final conversation with Ninoy right before he boarded the
plane to Manila. The following are excerpts from that new, historical record, which has
yet to be examined by academic scholars:
… Now this is the latest, Steve, that I can give you – my source is
Cardinal Sin … Number one, Marcos checked-in at the Kidney Center …
The experts went, saw him, they did the test. He flunked all the tests and
the conclusion was if they operate on him, it would be fatal … Apparently,
they are now moving to put in Imelda, in effective control … that‟s the
background that I‟m coming [into]…383
Steve Psinakis then, reminded Ninoy, “That‟s the good part. The bad part is that the
hardliners like [General Fabian] Ver who are bulldogs without any political savvy …
may think they‟re next in line.”384 Ninoy replied:
… [T]he rumor in Manila is that I am taking the private jet of Enrique
from Hong Kong, but all planes have been guarded and they may close the
airport on Sunday or turn back the plane if they will be able to pinpoint [it]
... [Another] one … is [that] … they have two guys stationed to knock me
out at the airport … [T]hey will try them for murder [afterwards, and] …
382
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convict them, but [the two guys] have assurances … I am meeting with
ASEAN leaders beginning Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday.
Indonesia‟s Suharto might receive me, Malaysia is already firm, and
Thailand is just about firm. Now, Japan has sent word that if Imelda is in
place, Nakasone is willing to use his economic clout … to tell Imelda, …
„if you treat Aquino nicely, we can [have a] dialogue‟ … Nakasone is
willing to send … a secret, private envoy with a personal letter making a
plea for me … [promising] that if they … [can] come up with some kind
of an understanding, Japanese economic assistance will continue …
[T]hey are very uptight and if the woman takes over … there will be chaos
… ASEAN today is already one region and any instability in one part of
ASEAN will scare investors in the entire region … Now to what extent
they can mitigate the hardliners, I don‟t know, that‟s the chance we have
to take.385
Then, referring to his chance of assassination, Ninoy continued:
Those are the trump cards I am bringing home, which of course, can be
negated if one character can blow me out…[But if not], … I will try to
hold out for a meeting with Marcos. Now that he is about to meet his
Maker, I am almost confident that I can talk to him and sell him
something...386
At this point, Psinakis asked Ninoy his last question, which was whether there was “any
indication from the U.S. side that they might be somewhat helpful or cooperative.” Ninoy
answered:
No indication except that they are watching me and they are following all
my steps … But I am still hopeful that … they will … eventually …
because I don‟t think they‟re very happy with [the prospect of] the woman
running the show …387
For the first time, this conversation proves that Ninoy understood quite clearly the
dangers that he faced in deciding to return home. While exiled in the United States,
however, Ninoy was certain that his place was at home, declaring that, “The Filipino is
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worth dying for.” This conversation also provides further evidence that Marcos had been
moving to install Imelda in his place, though that fact still remains unproven.

THOSE AT FAULT
In the aftermath, Marcos appointed five jurists to a special commission, created to
investigate Aquino‟s murder. Significantly, the Supreme Court accepted three suits
challenging the panel‟s competence and the Marcos suspended the investigation hearings,
pending the Supreme Court‟s decision.388 According to the official government account,
Rolando Galman, described as a “professional gunman,” had killed Ninoy with a single
bullet to the back of the head. After firing at Aquino, Galman “was killed by a fusillade
of bullets by the security men surrounding Mr. Aquino.”389 Yet, “how Mr. Galman, who
was wearing the uniform of the airport maintenance workers, managed to penetrate the
tight security screen in effect for Mr. Aquino‟s arrival,” Robert Trumbell in the New York
Times, writes, “is one of the unanswered questions in the case.”390
Aquino had been wearing a bulletproof vest and when Aquino stepped off the
plane, two guards escorted him and patted him. Rolando Galman shot at Aquino first, but
the subsequent onslaught of bullets, launched at the command: “Pusila, pusila,” makes it
difficult to tell precisely which bullet ultimately killed Ninoy. “Pusila” is Waray, a dialect
from Leyte, where Imelda and all her bodyguards were from. Marcos‟s bodyguards were
exclusively Ilocano, which seems to shift the blame to Imelda. One must consider,
however, Marcos‟s old tactic of deflecting the blame to Imelda. Additionally, given the
388
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strictly authoritative nature of his rule, it is hard to believe that such an order was carried
out without Marcos‟s approval.
Assassination was a step too far, however, even for Marcos, and it finally
galvanized the Philippine people against him. Then, nothing, not his consent to hold
presidential elections in 1985 or his subsequent “victory,” would turn back the tide. The
clumsiness of this miscalculation is highly uncharacteristic for Ferdinand and may
evidence that Imelda was behind it, not her husband. Perhaps, though, sickness and
desperation had overcome him and it was indeed Marcos‟s hand.
In the undelivered speech that he had prepared for his arrival, Aquino declares,
… I could have opted to seek political asylum in America, but I feel it is
my duty, as it is the duty of every Filipino, to suffer with his people
especially in time of crisis. I never sought nor have I been given any
assurances, or promises of leniency by the regime. I return voluntarily
armed only with a clear conscience and fortified in the faith that in the
end, justice will emerge triumphant … Rather than move forward we have
moved backward. The killings have increased, the economy has taken a
turn for the worse and the human rights situation has deteriorated. During
the martial law period, the Supreme Court heard petitions for habeas
corpus. It is most ironic after martial law has allegedly been lifted, that the
Supreme Court last April ruled it can no longer entertain petitions for
habeas corpus for persons detained under the Presidential Commitment
Order, which covers all so-called national security cases and which under
present circumstances can cover almost anything.391
Nowhere does Aquino denounce the failures of the other political bodies, besides the
Supreme Court. This is natural, because it was the Supreme Court that had most directly
betrayed him and refused to come to his aid in jail. Additionally, with regards to human
rights, it did truly fall upon the Supreme Court to protect the Philippine people, and it
repeatedly failed to do so.
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Aquino‟s speech continues,
The country is far advanced in her times of troubles … These problems
may be surmounted if we are united. But we can be united only if all the
rights and freedoms enjoyed before September 21, 1972 are fully restored
… There is a growing cadre of young Filipinos who have finally come to
realize that freedom is never granted, it is taken. Must we relive the
agonies and the blood-letting of the past that brought forth our republic or
can we sit down as brothers and sisters and discuss our differences with
reason and good will?
Therein, Aquino summarizes the lesson that the Philippines never learned, because the
U.S. ended their independence fight against Spain: “Freedom is never granted, it is
taken.” Filipinos cannot wait for the Supreme Court to grant it and cannot wait for an
unhealthy political tradition to correct itself.

THE FINAL DAYS
Criticism plagued every iteration of the government commission Marcos assigned
to investigate Aquino‟s assassination. Nonetheless, Marcos was genuinely shocked when
on October 10th, 1983, the latest commission, comprised of four retired Supreme Court
justices, dissolved itself and handed the President their resignation. Responding to
charges that the justices were too biased, in their letter, they suggested to Marcos that the
commission would enjoy greater respect and public standing if it included “members
acceptable to all sectors of society.”392
Though their culpability was unproven, the Filipino people and Supreme Court
could no longer justify Marcos‟s administration. Marcos‟s power ebbed increasingly. On
October 25th, 1983, the Supreme Court overturned the Manila city government‟s ban on
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demonstrations and sanctioned protests at the United States Embassy against American
bases in the Philippines. According to a New York Times article, the Supreme Court
declared in their ruling that there was “insufficient proof to back up claims by city
government, in issuing the ban, that Communist subversives would disrupt the march.”393
Exhibiting a striking change of tone, Justice Vicente Abad Santos describes the
Government as “paranoid,” immediately blaming the Communists “whenever anything
negative happens.”394
On August 18th, 1984, the Supreme Court went further still. Dismissing the
Government‟s claims that they would lead to “civil war,” the Court approved plans for
demonstrations marking the one-year anniversary of Aquino‟s death.395 The Supreme
Court stood with Ninoy against the Marcos government in their decision, describing
Aquino as a “leader who decided to go back to his country to attain peace.”396 The Court
approved the demonstrations, with assurance from its organizers that the marches and
rally would be peaceful. Yet, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza issued grave warnings
that the military had obtained intelligence indicating that the Communists had planned to
position snipers along the marches‟ routes and infiltrate assassins into the rally. 397 The
Court still ordered security forces to “observe a [discrete] distance from the participants,
with the duty of affording protection to the participants as well as to the general
public.”398
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By this point, in 1984, martial law had already been lifted and the regime was
only weakening. The military was breaking apart into competing factions, each plotting
coup attempts against Marcos. President Ramos explains that at this point, “The armed
forces of the Philippines were no longer [serving] the Philippines of the people, but …
became the special armed forces of just an elite group based in Malacañang [Palace].
Therefore, I withdrew my support.”399 In addition to all this, Marcos himself was ravaged
by his illness. The Supreme Court then finally began to rise against Marcos.

THE MEANING OF THE RULE OF LAW
In 1973, Rolando V. del Carmen posed the following question in Asian Survey:
On the balance sheet, the Court thus far has done the President more
service than disservice, more good than harm. And as long as the court
stays tractable, the President will be hesitant to resort to drastic measures
to silence it. But whether the President is truly under the “rule of law” is
another question which only he can ultimately answer, not through what
he says but through what he does in the difficult months, years, or who
knows – even decades – ahead.400
In retrospect, Ferdinand Marcos did not operate under the rule of law, though he was
obsessed with maintaining an appearance of constitutionality and thus, had a distinct
respect for the law. Like past politicians, Marcos subverted the rule of law, but the
difference lies in the unprecedented scope of his subversion. It is for this reason that he
required the complicity of the Supreme Court. Observation of the proper rule of law had
never been a true component of Philippine politics, but never too had the Courts
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legitimization

of

this

non-observation

been.

In

successfully

co-opting

and

outmaneuvering the judiciary, rather than break the tradition, Marcos extended it.
By 1974, Rolando V. del Carmen writes,
A close scrutiny of [the Supreme Court‟s] record during the period of
martial law reveals that the judicial department has thus far survived
adversity through a process of situational accommodation … It is also
apparent that perhaps resultant of circumstances beyond its control, the
judiciary can no longer be relied upon as the ultimate agency to which
individuals may turn for effective redress against the excesses of
government when all other means have failed. Given the realities of
martial law, there is consolation in the fact that although shaken and
weakened the courts still exist. This is much more than can be said of the
erstwhile Philippine Congress, which has long since passed into oblivion
with no immediate hopes of revival.401
The Marcos years eventually proved the Supreme Court to be no better than the
Congress, both ineffective and emasculated against Marcos‟s will. Petty but insistent
subversion of the rule of law has always been the political norm and the Supreme Court‟s
tolerance only further proves it.
Naturally a reactive and, thus, passive political body, the Supreme Court could
easily turn a blind eye to past politicians‟ sins, because it fell upon the public to submit
petitions for review. Under a state of rebellion and declaration of martial law, however,
the language of the 1935 Constitution strengthens the executive‟s power. For this reason,
the Cold War context gave Marcos the tools necessary for his dictatorship, and alongside
the judiciary, legitimized his actions.
In retrospect, it is hard to imagine the judiciary acting otherwise, for as the
interviews included here demonstrate, both the history and contemporary climate favored
Marcos. The judiciary operated within a tradition that allowed its politicians to
401
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unapologetically break the law. Marcos brought the tradition to its most extreme limits,
but because of the judiciary‟s legitimization, it cannot be said that he broke it. What lies
in stake in this question, whether Ferdinand Marcos was the aberration or apotheosis of
the system, is a judgment of the health of the Philippine political system. When one
considers what preceded and followed Marcos, particularly, the current President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo‟s ongoing attempts to remain in power, it is clear that the system itself
is unhealthy. Not the aberration, Marcos instead embodies the Philippine political
tradition‟s deepest ills. He has served to demonstrate to history, what the political
mandate truly means to the Philippines‟ politicians.
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EPILOGUE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
Immediately after the victory of the People Power Revolution of 1986, Corazon
Aquino assumed power and issued Proclamation No. 1, stating, “As a first step to restore
confidence in our administration, I expect all appointive public officials to submit their
courtesy resignation beginning with the members of the Supreme Court.”402 Thereafter,
President Aquino convened a Constitutional Commission to rewrite the Constitution and
on June 2nd, 1986, forty-eight appointed members from various fields, began the task of
writing the new Philippine Constitution.403 Atty. Romulo recounts, “We went around the
country and tried to elicit the opinion of people as to the form of government they desired
…. People wanted to elect their president; that was how they would express their
views.”404
The 1987 Constitution is the strongest window into how the public and Aquino‟s
administration viewed the emasculation of the judiciary under Marcos. It articulates their
conception of the judiciary‟s role within the balance of a proper separation of powers.
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee‟s handwritten notes from the Constitutional
Commission meetings highlight the importance of Article VIII, Section 1, which appears
as the first among the list of changes to be made to the Constitution.405 Article VIII,
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Section 1 outlines judicial power and greatly extends the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, defining judicial power to be:
The duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.406
The power to decide whether or not there have been “grave abuses of discretion” allows
the Supreme Court to settle political arguments. Previously, the Supreme Court tended to
refrain from deciding upon political matters and authorities defended themselves against
the judiciary by invoking the political nature of their actions, which was outside the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This political protection was the first provision that the
Constitutional Commission removed. Importantly, because the phrase “grave abuses of
discretion” is somewhat ambiguous, the provision can expand or contract according to
the nature of the Supreme Court and its willingness to intervene in political matters.407
The immediate attention that the Constitutional Commission paid to the
judiciary‟s power and its role in protecting the people against the executive and
legislative branch reflects the Supreme Court‟s ineffectiveness under President Marcos.
In a further act of judicial empowerment, Article VIII, Section 5, Part 2 grants the
Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases regarding ambassadors, public ministers, consuls
etc., and reserves for the high court, final judgment on the constitutionality of any
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government decree or pronouncement.408 Additionally, under the 1987 Constitution, only
Congress may grant the President emergency powers, stating:
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.409

THE EMBOLDENED SUPREME COURT
In the “1986 Annual Report on the Operations and Activities of the Judiciary,”
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee writes,
A free and independent Judiciary is imperative in any democratic society.
The Constitution and democratic traditions may be upheld only through
the judicial power that is vested exclusively in the „Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.‟ (Article VIII, Section 1,
1987 Constitution) The institution of judicial review serves as a check that
every official act must be based on law that does not contravene the
limitations imposed by the Constitution and that it be performed
conformably to law.410
President Marcos‟s long “constitutional authoritarianism” deeply scarred the Philippines.
Recognizing the judiciary‟s recent inadequacies and failures, the Constitutional
Commission wrote the 1987 Constitution with the explicit intent of preventing a crisis
executive from manipulating the judiciary in order to perpetuate a crisis regime‟s
assumption of power.
In the “1986 Annual Report of the Supreme Court,” Chief Justice Teehankee
seeks to restore confidence in the judiciary, writing,
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If under the past unlamented regime, the spirit of the laws was lost in the
convolutions of fine rhetoric, and found its voice expressed only in
seemingly futile dissents, now this spirit is again enthroned in all majestic
splendor in the institution of the Supreme Court that has been known as
the citadel of truth and justice.411
With such expanded powers of judicial review, the Supreme Court could reclaim its title
as the guarantor of justice and regain its role within the system of checks and balances.
The Philippine people hoped that with such expanded powers, the Supreme Court‟s
independence would be permanently guaranteed and no longer vulnerable to the
manipulations of crisis regimes seeking to justify dictatorship as “constitutional
authoritarianism.”

411
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